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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 20, 2007, billionaire hotelier Leona Helmsley died,
survived by her brother, four grandchildren, twelve great-grandchildren,1
and her beloved companion of eight years, a white Maltese dog named
Trouble.2 One week later came news that shocked the world. Helmsley left
$12 million to Trouble.3
Across the globe, reporters, readers, lawyers, and law professors alike
greeted the news with outrage and derision. Critics called the legacy
―obscene,‖4 ―ridiculous,‖5 and, as lawyer Mickey Sherman put it, ―an
amazing waste of money.‖6 In a letter to the editor of her local newspaper,
a Rochester woman expressed her disgust at Helmsley‘s decision, noting
that the $12 million ―could have provided 100 homeless families a house
or 100 deserving kids a college education[,] . . . fed a small nation or
served thousands of neglected children.‖7 A University of Texas columnist
reminded her readers that dogs are ―notoriously bad money managers [and]
. . . lack the opposable thumbs necessary to use a calculator or the
computer skills to do their banking online.‖8
However, Helmsley‘s long-time rival, Donald Trump, provided a very
different perspective. On hearing the news of Trouble‘s $12 million
inheritance, he released the following statement: ‗―The dog is the only

1. Dennis McLellan, Obituaries: Leona Helmsley, 87, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at B8.
2. Trouble turned out to be aptly named. She had a penchant for biting Helmsley‘s
employees and customers and once even bit ―a diner in a top New York restaurant.‖ Jane Fryer, Her
Name‟s Trouble and, with £6m in the Bank, She‟s the World‟s Richest Dog, DAILY MAIL (London),
Dec. 6, 2007, at 61.
3. Leona Helmsley did not leave the $12 million outright to Trouble. Instead, she ―left $12
million in her will to an inter vivos pet trust that she created pursuant to the New York pet trust
statute.‖ Frances Carlisle, Helmsley Pet Trust Raises Issues for Owners of All Income Levels, 241
N.Y. L.J. 4 (2009); see also Last Will and Testament of Leona M. Helmsley art. 1F (July 15, 2005),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/city_room/20070829_helmsleywill.pdf
(leaving $12 million to the trustees of the Leona Helmsley July 2005 Trust). In 2008, Manhattan
Surrogate Judge Renee Roth reduced Trouble‘s trust fund to $2 million. Jeffrey Toobin, Rich Bitch:
The Legal Battle Over Trust Funds for Pets, NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 2008, at 38.
4. Stevie Lacy-Pendleton, The Pampered Furry and Human Need, STATEN ISLAND
ADVANCE, Aug. 31, 2007, at A22.
5. Barbara Gelinas, Doggone Waste: Dogs are Bad with Money, SHORTHORN, Sept. 12,
2007, at 5.
6. Leona Helmsley Leaves Dog $12 Million (CBS television broadcast Sept. 27, 2008)
(quoting Mickey Sherman) (transcript on file with author).
7. Jessica Shanahan, Letter to the Editor, Dog‟s Inheritance Symbolized Legacy, ROCHESTER
DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Sept. 7, 2007, at 11A.
8. Gelinas, supra note 5.
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thing that loved her and deserves every single penny of it.‖‘ Helmsley‘s
former housekeeper, Zamfira Sfara, was also not shocked by Trouble‘s
good fortune.10 Indeed, she reported that the bond between Helmsley and
Trouble was so close11 that when Helmsley left her hotel penthouse, ―[t]he
dog would stay by the door, lying on the floor for three hours, waiting for
her to come. It never moved.‖12
This Article argues that Trouble—and the millions13 of American
pets14 like her15—should inherit. For many Americans today, their pets, not
their human family members, are their nearest and dearest.
In earlier work,16 I have argued that American inheritance law is
trapped in an outdated family paradigm. That paradigm assumes that the
9. Editorial, Where There‟s a Will, There‟s a Way to Stay „Queen of Mean,‟ CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2007, at 43 (quoting Donald Trump).
10. Kerry Burke & Jose Martinez, Nothing But Trouble, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Aug. 30, 2007,
at 7 (stating that Sfara was not surprised to hear Helmsley left $12 million to Trouble). Like Trump,
Sfara observed: ―Leona wanted everybody to love her, but she knew nobody loved her . . . . This
dog replaced that love.‖ Id.
11. This is not to say that Sfara approved of the relationship between Helmsley and Trouble.
In fact, she described that relationship as ―unnatural.‖ Id.
12. Manny Fernandez, A Newly Minted Multimillionaire Can‟t Buy Herself a Friend, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2007, at B3.
13. Press Release, Am. Pet Prods. Ass‘n, New Survey Reveals that When It Comes to Caring
for Our Faithful Companions, American Pet Owners are Top Dog (Aug. 31, 2009),
http://www.media.americanpetproducts.org (―[T]here are 77.5 million dogs, 93.6 million cats, 171.7
million freshwater fish, 11.2 million saltwater fish, 15 million birds, 15.9 million small animals,
13.63 million reptiles and 13.3 million horses owned in the U.S.‖ (citing statistics in the American
Pet Products Association‘s 2009–2010 National Pet Owners Survey)). Inheritance by pets is by no
means solely a U.S. phenomenon. For example, the United Kingdom‘s largest pet insurance
provider, Petplan, published the 2009 Pet Rich List, which included wealthy pets from Australia,
Canada, England, Germany, and South Africa. See Marie Kierans, Editorial, For Richer for Paw-er,
MIRROR (London), Aug. 15, 2009, at 10 (listing the twenty wealthiest pets on Petplan‘s 2009 Pet
Rich List); Fat Cats; The Rich, the Cute and the Furry, PETPLAN (Aug. 12, 2009),
http://www.petplan.co.uk/contactus/press/affluent_pets.asp (identifying the forty-seven wealthiest
pets on the list).
14. Many authors prefer the terms ―companion animals‖ and ―human guardians‖ to ―pets‖ and
―owners‖ on grounds that the latter terms ―wrongfully connote property values, rather than
suggesting the close bond of companionship and love that can be shared between human animals
and those animals of a different species.‖ Vasiliki Agorianitis, Comment, Being Daphne‟s Mom: An
Argument for Valuing Companion Animals as Companions, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1453, 1454
n.2 (2006). Although I am sympathetic to these concerns, I have continued to employ the terms
―pets‖ and ―owners‖ in this Article because of their widespread usage and familiarity to most
readers. In fact, even the Humane Society, which ―preferred ‗companion animal‘ until
recently, . . . bowed to popular usage and returned to ‗pet.‘‖ KATHERINE C. GRIER, PETS IN AMERICA:
A HISTORY 7 (2006).
15. This is not meant to suggest that there is another pet anywhere who shares Trouble‘s
unique—for better or worse—personality and life story. Rather, this refers to a pet, like Trouble,
with whom the decedent had a close bond.
16. Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199 (2001)
[hereinafter Foster, Family Paradigm]; Frances H. Foster, Individualized Justice in Disputes over
Dead Bodies, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1351 (2008) [hereinafter Foster, Individualized Justice].
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decedent‘s closest relatives by blood, adoption, or marriage are the most
deserving recipients of the decedent‘s estate, the so-called ‗―natural objects
of the decedent‘s bounty.‘‖17 Using a humanistic approach, I have shown
that this abstract vision of ―natural‖ wealth distribution permeates law and
decisionmaking and creates significant human costs.18 By ignoring the
actual relationships between decedents and survivors, the family paradigm
excludes the very people a particular decedent may have valued most—
those connected by affection and support rather than by family status.19
This Article extends my critique. It argues that the family paradigm also
fails to recognize survivors many Americans regard as their closest
companions, friends, and even family—their pets.
Part II presents my critique of the family paradigm. It shows how that
paradigm excludes decedents‘ nonhuman as well as human loved ones.
The result is an inheritance system that defeats decedents‘ wishes and
leaves their most beloved companions unprotected.
Part III turns to recent reform strategies. It analyzes those strategies as
pursuing three main goals: (1) enforcing pet care arrangements on an ad
hoc basis; (2) improving legal mechanisms to provide for decedents‘ pets;
and (3) redefining the legal status of pets. Part III concludes that these
strategies offer only partial solutions because they fail to challenge the
family paradigm.
Part IV offers a new approach. It attacks the very foundation of
American inheritance law—the narrow status-based definition of ―natural
objects of the decedent‘s bounty.‖ Drawing on recent studies, this Part
demonstrates that many Americans are now as close or closer to their pets
than their human family members. Part IV then considers possible new
directions for an inheritance system that regards inheritance by pets as
―natural.‖ Part V concludes that reformers must look beyond the family
paradigm‘s abstractions and develop more individualized approaches that
encompass a decedent‘s actual natural objects―be they human or
nonhuman.

17. Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1357 (quoting Mundy v. Simmons, 424
A.2d 135, 139 (Me. 1980)); see also Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 205–21.
18. See, e.g., Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 240–51 (setting out the human costs
of the family paradigm). I have also used this approach to identify the human costs of trust privacy.
Frances H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 559, 584–612 (2008).
19. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 245 (stating that the family paradigm
excludes ―caring relationships with extended family members, nonmarital partners, close friends,
and nonrelated caregivers‖); see also Frances H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance: A New
Model from China, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1199, 1239–40, 1257 (arguing that the U.S. inheritance
system fails to recognize survivors who provided the decedent support because ―[u]nder inflexible
status-based intestacy rules, contributions to the decedent‘s welfare are irrelevant for inheritance
purposes‖).
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II. PETS UNDER THE FAMILY PARADIGM OF INHERITANCE LAW:
COMPANIONS DURING LIFE, PROPERTY AT DEATH
A. The Family Paradigm‟s Narrow Definition of “Natural Objects of a
Decedent‟s Bounty”
American inheritance law is entrenched in a family paradigm that
exalts family status over affection, support, and behavior.20 If a decedent
dies without a will, the rigid status-based rules of intestacy apply.21 The
decedent‘s closest relatives by blood, adoption, or marriage automatically
inherit.22 They are, by definition, the ―natural objects of the decedent‘s
bounty.‖23 Survivors‘ actual relationships with the decedent are
irrelevant.24 The daughter who abandoned her father inherits.25 The partner,
sister, or friend who shared his life does not.26
20. For extended discussion, see Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 205–22. In
earlier comparative law work, I focused specifically on the American inheritance system‘s failure to
factor in behavior and support. Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of
Inheritance?: The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 77, 79–81, 84 (1998) (arguing that
the American status-based model disregards heirs‘ actual behavior—good and bad—toward the
decedent); Foster, supra note 19, at 1217–54 (arguing that U.S. inheritance law fails to recognize
survivors‘ support needs and contributions).
21. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES
AND FAMILY PROPERTY 9, 13 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) (referring to inheritance rules as a
―rigid scheme‖); Paula A. Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”: Should Support and Inheritance Be
Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 259–60, 291–98 (1994) (criticizing the ―status-based‖ approach
of current intestacy law and proposing a ―behavior-based model of inheritance‖).
22. For a summary of common patterns of American intestacy statutes, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 2 (1999); see also JEFFREY A.
SCHOENBLUM, 2009 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING tbl.8 (2008) (summarizing the
intestacy laws of all states).
23. Mundy v. Simmons, 424 A.2d 135, 139 (Me. 1980) (defining ―the surviving spouse and
those who stand in closest relationship within the blood line as the natural objects of the decedent‘s
bounty‖); see also Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using Mediation to Resolve Probate
Disputes over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 418 (1997)
(―‗[N]atural objects of decedent‘s bounty‘ . . . . [have been] long considered to be persons related
by blood, marriage, or adoption.‖).
24. See Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1360 (―[B]y focusing on survivors‘
family status alone, current rules assume that the decedent‘s ‗closest‘ relatives are entitled to inherit
and ignore those individuals‘ actual behavior toward the decedent, no matter how reprehensible.‖).
This disregard for actual relationships between decedents and survivors is by no means limited to
the intestacy context. See Tanya K. Hernández, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 988
(1999) (―The law of wills focuses upon the familial status of the beneficiary rather than upon the
quality of the beneficiary‘s relationship to the decedent.‖).
25. For examples of cases where children abandoned or physically, emotionally, and
financially abused their parents and still were able to inherit from their parents, see Foster, Family
Paradigm, supra note 16, at 240; Kymberleigh N. Korpus, Note, Extinguishing Inheritance Rights:
California Breaks New Ground in the Fight Against Elder Abuse but Fails to Build an Effective
Foundation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 537, 537–42 (2001).
26. For a discussion of such cases, see Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 240–43,
245–48. ―For those excluded from the family paradigm, the effects can be emotionally as well as
financially devastating. . . . Survivors find themselves ‗treat[ed] . . . as if they were strangers‘ to the
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Efforts to bypass the family paradigm by will, trust, or contract also fall
victim to the paradigm‘s narrow status-based definition of natural
objects.27 Indeed, inheritance law‘s bias in favor of the traditional family is
so strong that dispositions to those outside the immediate family circle are
considered ―unnatural.‖28
Trusts and estates scholars have presented a devastating critique of the
family paradigm. They have demonstrated that this paradigm transmits a
―culture through property‖29 that is alien and harmful30 to many Americans.
Scholars have shown that by privileging membership in the ―traditional‖
family, American inheritance law systematically discriminates on the basis
of race,31 ethnicity,32 gender,33 class,34 and sexuality.35 This discrimination
is so pervasive that it can even render the so-called ―organizing principle‖36
of American inheritance law—freedom of disposition—a ―myth.‖37 As
individuals with whom they shared years of affection, intimacy, and companionship.‖ Id. at 248
(quoting Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16
LAW & INEQ. 1, 89 (1998)).
27. See Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 209–19 (discussing the family paradigm‘s
impact on wills, will substitutes, and contracts to devise).
28. In re Estate of Gersbach, 960 P.2d 811, 817 (N.M. 1998) (―We must conclude the gift to
Warren is ‗unnatural‘ because he would not inherit under the laws of intestacy and that the prior gift
to Mrs. Gerbach was ‗natural‘ because she would have been an intestate heir.‖).
29. LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 11 (2d ed. 1997).
30. For a discussion of the human costs of the family paradigm, see Foster, Family Paradigm,
supra note 16, at 240–51; see also Elvia R Arriola, Law and the Family of Choice and Need, 35 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 691, 694 (1997) (criticizing the view that ―love and feelings in some
relationships just do not matter because the resident status, or sexual status, or human rights status
of these relationships is not traditional or legal‖).
31. See, e.g., Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum
Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999) (documenting the role of private law in perpetuating
traditional racial hierarchies); Kevin Noble Maillard, The Color of Testamentary Freedom, 62 SMU
L. REV. 1783 (2009) (examining racial bias in the context of testamentary transfers).
32. See, e.g., Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 245–48.
33. See, e.g., Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and
Demographic Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 63–68 (2009); Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and
Trusts: “The Kingdom of the Fathers,” 10 LAW & INEQ. 137 (1991) (maintaining that wills and
trusts law has been historically, and continues to be, skewed in favor of men). For a comparative
law empirical study, see Daphna Hacker, The Gendered Dimensions of Inheritance: Empirical Food
for Legal Thought, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 322 (2010).
34. See, e.g., DiRusso, supra note 33, at 76–77; Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the
Living, the Law of the Dead: Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 377.
35. For a sampling of the extensive literature on discrimination against gay, lesbian, bisexual,
and transgender individuals, see A. Spencer Bergstedt, Estate Planning and the Transgender Client,
30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 675 (2008); Fellows et al., supra note 26; Amy D. Ronner, Homophobia:
In the Closet and in the Coffin, 21 LAW & INEQ. 65 (2003).
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a
(2001).
37. Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 235–36,
273 (1996); see also Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 576
(1997) (arguing that the ―undue influence doctrine denies freedom of testation for people who
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Professor Kevin Maillard concluded from his study of interracial will
contests, ―Testamentary freedom, in all of its aspirational claims, means
nothing in the face of a legal system rooted in the restrictive and damaging
conformity of ‗legitimate‘ families.‖38
In a vast and ever-growing literature, trusts and estates scholars have
exposed the family paradigm as outdated, underinclusive,39 and
discriminatory. They have shown that the family the paradigm celebrates
and rewards――a legally married husband and wife, and the children of that
marriage‖40―is rapidly disappearing. Scholars have made a compelling
case that, as more and more Americans find affection and support outside
the nuclear family, the family paradigm excludes those who should inherit:
the survivors whose lives had been ―most intimately intertwined with the
decedent‘s.‖41 The family paradigm declares ―unnatural‖ the very
relationships many Americans now regard as ―natural.‖
Established scholars and new voices in the field have identified a
lengthy list of decedents‘ loved ones the family paradigm excludes. For
example, Professors Mary Louise Fellows,42 Thomas Gallanis,43 and Gary
Spitko44 have shown that the traditional definition of ―spouse‖ excludes
those who cannot or choose not to marry: unmarried same-sex and
opposite-sex cohabitants. Several authors have emphasized the particular
challenges the traditional definition poses for transsexual spouses and
partners.45
Numerous scholars have demonstrated that the definition of ―child‖ is
deviate from judicially imposed testamentary norms—in particular, the norm that people should
provide for their families‖); Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence
Should Be Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 245, 246 (2010) (―Rather than protecting testamentary
freedom, [the undue influence doctrine] is a means to keep inheritance within families, or at least
within relationships fitting preconceived social norms.‖).
38. Maillard, supra note 31, at 1816.
39. Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 41
(2000) (―The definition may be underinclusive because it excludes many currently existing family
groups . . . .‖); Michael J. Higdon, When Informal Adoption Meets Intestate Succession: The
Cultural Myopia of the Equitable Adoption Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 254–55 n.202
(2008) (―Particularly vulnerable to this underinclusiveness are those families who do not conform to
the ‗traditional‘ family model.‖). For a comprehensive analysis of how inheritance law fails to
―reflect modern American famil[y]‖ life, see generally RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND
THE EVOLVING FAMILY 7 (2004).
40. Gary, supra note 39, at 28.
41. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 242.
42. See, e.g., Fellows et al., supra note 26.
43. See, e.g., T.P. Gallanis, Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the Movement for Same-Sex
Equality, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1513 (1999); T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79
TUL. L. REV. 55 (2004).
44. See, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance
Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REV. 255 (2002); E. Gary Spitko, The
Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV.
1063 (1999).
45. See, e.g., Bergstedt, supra note 35; Melissa Aubin, Comment, Defying Classification:
Intestacy Issues for Transsexual Surviving Spouses, 82 OR. L. REV. 1155 (2003).
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equally problematic.46 Here, too, inheritance law fails to encompass
survivors outside the traditional nuclear family unit, such as nonmarital
children,47 equitably adopted children,48 adult adoptees,49 and nonrelated
individuals in a child-parent relationship with the decedent.50 Other authors
have called attention to another source of exclusion―inheritance law‘s
failure to update its definitions of ―child‖ and ―parent‖ to reflect advances
in reproductive technology51 and paternity testing.52 Thus, as Professors
Browne Lewis,53 Paula Monopoli,54 and Lee-ford Tritt55 have recently
46. As Professor Ralph Brashier has observed, an ―increasingly notable shortcoming[] of
modern probate law is its failure to provide adequate guidelines governing the inheritance rights of
children outside the traditional nuclear family.‖ Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the
Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93, 94. For an outstanding, comprehensive critique of
the default rules of intestacy law, especially those of the Uniform Probate Code, regarding the
parent-child relationship, see Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift: Competing
Default Rule Theories Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 273 (2010).
47. See, e.g., Browne Lewis, Children of Men: Balancing the Inheritance Rights of Marital
and Non-Marital Children, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm:
Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345 (2011); Paula
A. Monopoli, Nonmarital Children and Post-Death Parentage: A Different Path for Inheritance
Law?, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857 (2008).
48. See, e.g., Higdon, supra note 39 (tracing the history of the equitable adoption doctrine
and proposing steps to cure the doctrine‘s shortcomings); Irene D. Johnson, A Suggested Solution to
the Problem of Intestate Succession in Nontraditional Family Arrangements: Taking the
“Adoption” (and the Inequity) Out of the Doctrine of “Equitable Adoption,” 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
271 (2009).
49. See, e.g., Terry L. Turnipseed, Scalia‟s Ship of Revulsion Has Sailed: Will Lawrence
Protect Adults Who Adopt Lovers to Help Ensure Their Inheritance from Incest Prosecution?, 32
HAMLINE L. REV. 95 (2009); Peter T. Wendel, The Succession Rights of Adopted Adults: Trying to
Fit a Square Peg into a Round Hole, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 815 (2010) (proposing inheritance
schemes in different adult adoption contexts).
50. See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U.
MEM. L. REV. 643 (2002) (examining intestacy system shortcomings in the context of nonrelated
individuals).
51. For a sampling of the extensive literature on the impact of reproductive technology on
inheritance rights, see Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem
Conception, Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 967 (1996); Kristine S.
Knaplund, Equal Protection, Postmortem Conception, and Intestacy, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 627
(2005); Raymond C. O‘Brien, The Momentum of Posthumous Conception: A Model Act, 25 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 332 (2009).
52. See, e.g., Ilene Sherwyn Cooper, Posthumous Paternity Testing: A Proposal to Amend
EPTL 4-1.2(a)(2)(D), 69 ALB. L. REV. 947 (2006); Gregory Todd Jones, Disinterment and DNA
Testing: Providing for Court Orders for Disinterment and DNA Testing in Certain Cases Where the
Kinship of Any Party in Interest to a Decedent is in Controversy, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 347 (2002).
53. Browne C. Lewis, Dead Men Reproducing: Responding to the Existence of Afterdeath
Children, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 403 (2009) (discussing the impact of reproductive technology);
Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations Between the Men
Involved in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 949 (2009) (same).
54. See Monopoli, supra note 47, at 859 (discussing the impact of ―scientific advances in
paternity testing‖).
55. Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated Functionally Based Approach to
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underscored, these definitions are becoming obsolete in a world where a
child can be conceived posthumously,56 have her parentage determined by
DNA testing of her father‘s corpse,57 or if born in a surrogacy arrangement,
potentially claim any of eight individuals as a parent.58
Scholars have demonstrated that the definitional problems go beyond
the family paradigm‘s preferential categories of spouse, child, and parent.
They have shown that the paradigm‘s narrow concept of family disregards
the changing nature of the American family, in which blended,59
committed,60 and extended61 family members may well be a decedent‘s
―natural objects.‖ Professor Kristine Knaplund, for example, has criticized
inheritance law for failing to recognize the central role many grandparents
now play in raising their children‘s children.62 A few scholars have looked
outside the family altogether and identified nonrelated individuals whom
the family paradigm excludes. For example, Professors John Gaubatz,63
Laura Rosenbury,64 and I65 have criticized inheritance law‘s status-based
Parent-Child Property Succession, 62 SMU L. REV. 367 (2009) (discussing reproductive
technology and inheritance rights).
56. For an example of a case involving inheritance rights of a posthumously conceived child,
see In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Sur. Ct. 2007).
57. For an example of a case in which a body was exhumed to determine a child‘s paternity
through DNA testing, see In re Estate of Michael Dennis Tytanic, 61 P.3d 249 (Okla. 2002).
58. Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood By Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the
Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 602 (2002) (―The fragmentation of
parentage by assisted reproduction creates the possibility that a child conceived by this means could
have as many as eight parents: the egg donor, the sperm donor, their spouses, the surrogate and her
husband, and the intending mother and father.‖).
59. See, e.g., Ralph C. Brashier, Consanguinity, Sibling Relationships, and the Default Rules
of Inheritance Law: Reshaping Half-blood Statutes to Reflect the Evolving Family, 58 SMU L. REV.
137 (2005); Andrew L. Noble, Intestate Succession for Stepchildren in Pennsylvania: A Proposal
for Reform, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 835 (2003); Peter Wendel, Inheritance Rights and the Step-Partner
Adoption Paradigm: Shades of the Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 351 (2005).
60. See, e.g., Fellows et al., supra note 26; Jennifer Seidman, Comment, Functional Families
and Dysfunctional Laws: Committed Partners and Intestate Succession, 75 U. COLO. L. REV 211
(2004); Carissa R. Trast, Note, You Can‟t Choose Your Parents: Why Children Raised by Same-Sex
Couples Are Entitled to Inheritance Rights from Both Their Parents, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 857
(2006).
61. See, e.g., Kristine S. Knaplund, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren and the
Implications for Inheritance, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2006); Neta Sazonov, Note, Expanding the
Statutory Definition of “Child” in Intestacy Law: A Just Solution for the Inheritance Difficulties
Grandparent Caregivers‟ Grandchildren Currently Face, 17 ELDER L.J. 401 (2010). For a
discussion of how exclusion of extended family members is ethnically biased, see Foster, Family
Paradigm, supra note 16, at 245–46.
62. Knaplund, supra note 61.
63. John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497, 559
(1977) (stating that a ―decedent‘s close family might include nonblood relatives and friends‖).
64. Laura Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 204–05 (2007) (―Even
if friends are performing many, or all, of the functions traditionally ascribed to spouses, parents, or
children, friends are not eligible . . . to inherit each other‘s estates under state intestacy rules.‖).
65. Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1359 (―[B]y privileging the traditional
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rules for ignoring the claims of nonrelated caregivers, friends, and others
who were a decedent‘s principal source of affection and support.
In sum, trusts and estates scholars have presented an extensive and
persuasive critique of the family paradigm. They have shown that the
paradigm increasingly denies inheritance rights to the very individuals
decedents regarded as their nearest and dearest. These scholars have failed
to appreciate, however, the full range of survivors the family paradigm
ignores. As the next section will show, the family paradigm excludes the
decedent‘s nonhuman as well as human loved ones.
B. Extension to Pets
In his 2000 will, Timothy Kirk Saueressig repeatedly instructed his
beneficiaries to take care of his four cats.66 He wrote: ―They are my
family!!‖67 Saueressig is not alone. An estimated 80% of Americans regard
their pets as members of their family.68 Yet, under the family paradigm of
inheritance law, pets do not count as family.
If the decedent dies without a will, even her closest nonhuman
companions and family members do not qualify as heirs. The nephew who
has not seen his aunt for twenty years inherits her property.69 The Angora
cat who gave an elderly woman ―‗a reason to keep living‘‖70 is her
property. Statutory family support mechanisms too do not apply to a
decedent‘s pets.71 Pets are left unprotected, their fate determined by the
decedent‘s human survivors. And that fate can be precarious indeed. For
example, an elderly New York woman died, survived by her adult
grandchildren and two ―cherished parakeets.‖72 Unfortunately, she left no
instructions regarding the care of her birds. Instead, she trusted her
survivors to do what they ―thought best.‖73 The grandchildren‘s solution
family, inheritance law ignores the claims of survivors the decedent may have valued most: her
close friends, caregivers, and other nonrelatives with whom she shared an ‗affection-support‘
relationship.‖); Foster, supra note 19, at 1239–40 (arguing that status-based rules exclude
caregivers). For an extended discussion of how wills law and intestate succession should recognize
the contributions of family and nonrelated caregivers to a decedent‘s welfare, see Joshua C. Tate,
Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 129 (2008).
66. In re Estate of Saueressig, 136 P.3d 201, 209 n.11 (Cal. 2006).
67. Id.
68. Elizabeth Paek, Fido Seeks Full Membership in the Family: Dismantling the Property
Classification of Companion Animals by Statute, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 481, 482 (2003) (―[M]ore
than 80% of companion animal guardians consider their companion animals as family members.‖).
69. See, e.g., Waldecker v. Pfefferle, No. E-02-002, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 6016, at *10 (Ct.
App. Nov. 8, 2002) (reporting that one of the decedent‘s heirs ―stated that he had not seen his aunt
for 20 years‖).
70. Ranny Green, Tinker the Cat‟s in the Cream, OREGONIAN, Dec. 29, 1993, at F2 (quoting
Ann Morgan‘s friend, Ruth Ward, about Morgan‘s relationship with her Angora cat, Tinker).
71. For a critical summary of statutory support mechanisms for a decedent‘s closest surviving
family members, see Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 219–21.
72. DAVID CONGALTON & CHARLOTTE ALEXANDER, WHEN YOUR PET OUTLIVES YOU:
PROTECTING ANIMAL COMPANIONS AFTER YOU DIE 2 (2002) (reporting this case).
73. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss4/1

10

Foster: Should Pets Inherit?

2011]

SHOULD PETS INHERIT?

811

was to bring the parakeets to the funeral home visitation for their
grandmother, wring the birds‘ necks, and put the bodies in the
grandmother‘s casket.
Luckily, many Americans are not so trusting. They have the foresight
to make advance arrangements for the care of their pets. According to
recent studies, 27% of American pet owners who have wills include their
pets in their wills.74 A 2009 survey revealed that one-third of dog, cat, and
bird owners and one-half of horse owners specify in their wills a
caretaker/guardian for their pet.75 Published reports confirm that
Americans use wills to express their love and concern for their nonhuman
survivors. For example, in a joint will, a Colorado couple provided for the
―faithful and loving care of our dog ‗Peggy‘ a Boston Bull, for the devotion
and affectionate companionship she gave to us during our lives.‖76 A New
York brokerage-house manager‘s will left one-fourth of her estate in trust
for her cats and stated: ―‗The welfare of my pets is paramount.‖77
For over a century, U.S. courts have confronted both testamentary and
nontestamentary schemes78 to provide for a wide variety of animals,
including dogs, cats, parrots, horses, burros, and chimpanzees.79 Courts
have acknowledged that a decedent‘s pets may be her closest friends,
companions, and even ―sole immediate family.‖80 Yet, as this section will
show, courts have often81 frustrated decedents‘ efforts to ensure care for
74. BARRY SELTZER & GERRY W. BEYER, FAT CATS & LUCKY DOGS: HOW TO LEAVE (SOME
54 (2010).
75. Press Release, Am. Pet Prods. Ass‘n, supra note 13 (reproducing the American Pet
Products Manufacturers Association‘s news release summarizing the results of its 2009–2010
National Pet Owners Survey).
76. Ireland v. Jacobs, 163 P.2d 203, 204 (Colo. 1945) (reproducing Frederick J. Leibold‘s
and Bertha M. Leibold‘s joint will).
77. Frank Donnelly, Caring for Pets After You‟re Dead, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE, Aug. 31,
2008, at A1 (quoting Susan M. Ryder‘s will).
78. For an outstanding in-depth analysis of English and American courts‘ treatment of legal
mechanisms for the care of decedents‘ pets, see Gerry W. Beyer, Pet Animals: What Happens When
Their Humans Die?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 617, 621–49 (2000); see also James T. Brennan,
Bequests for the Care of Specific Animals, 6 DUQ. L. REV. 15, 22–39 (1967); Christine Cave,
Comment, Trusts: Monkeying Around with Our Pets‟ Futures: Why Oklahoma Should Adopt a PetTrust Statute, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 627, 632–44 (2002).
79. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hart, 311 P.2d 605, 614 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (involving
will providing that the testator‘s ―domestic animals,‖ including horses and a burro, ―shall be kept in
the Park and properly fed and cared for by‖ the devisee of the park property); In re Fouts, 677
N.Y.S.2d 699, 699 (Sur. Ct. 1998) (involving an inter vivos trust for the benefit of five
chimpanzees); In re Renner‘s Estate, 57 A.2d 836, 837 (Pa. 1948) (involving will providing for the
care of the testator‘s dog and parrot); Hahn v. Stange, No. 04-07-00253-CV, 2008 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1027, at *2 (Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2008) (noting letter providing for the care of the decedent‘s
―cats, numbering ten, and any more that may come along‖). Some testators use a broad category to
encompass all possible types of pets. See, e.g., In re Estate of Verdisson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363, 364
(Ct. App. 1992) (―‗I leave my pets to Mr. Wardaman [Vardanian] and $20,000.00 to take care of
them upon my death.‘‖).
80. In re Howells‘ Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 598, 602 (Sur. Ct. 1932).
81. As will be discussed below, some courts have enforced such arrangements on an ad hoc
OF) YOUR ESTATE TO YOUR PET
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pets―be it by will, trust, or contract. Under the family paradigm of
inheritance law, nonhuman survivors, no matter how beloved, are not
―natural objects of the decedent‘s bounty.‖
1. Wills
Under the law of wills, pets cannot inherit. The Siamese cat or
Labrador dog may have been the decedent‘s best friend and companion82
and even the ―‗entire reason for her existence.‘‖83 Yet, if the decedent
leaves all or part of her estate directly to her pet, the legacy is void. In the
eyes of the law, the pet is mere property, with rights no greater than those
of the decedent‘s ―living room sofa.‖84 Under the family paradigm of
inheritance law, a decedent‘s pet may be her family during life but is only
her property at death. And, just as ―a refrigerator cannot inherit the stove
and kitchen sink,‖85 a pet cannot inherit. Property cannot own property.86
If a testator leaves money to a pet, the cash and even the pet itself may
end up in the hands of the very person the testator did not want to benefit.
Consider, for example, a case that is a staple of law school Trusts and
Estates courses―In re Estate of Russell.87 Thelma Russell wrote a valid
holographic will on a small card. On the front side, she left ―‗everything I
basis. See infra Part III.A. For extended discussion of ―grounds by which those courts have
acquiesced in gifts for the benefit of pets,‖ see Beyer, supra note 78, at 635–49.
82. See, e.g., Waldecker v. Pfefferle, No. E-02-002, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 6016, at *3–4
(Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2002) (quoting Ruth A. Lovett‘s will, which stated that the testator ―‗had cats as
friends and companions‘‖ and provided for her ―‗companion, [her] Siamese cat, SINBAD‘‖); Lewis
Kamb & Jeffrey M. Barker, Dog Adds Twist to Raymond Case, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug.
14, 2003, at A1 (quoting James McClintock‘s will, which described his black Labrador mix dog as
a ―‗wonderful pet, who has been a faithful companion and friend for many years‘‖).
83. In re Capers Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121, 127 (Orphans‘ Ct. 1964) (quoting the
testator‘s doctor‘s testimony).
84. Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. 2001) (criticizing ―the law‘s cold
characterization of a dog . . . as mere ‗property‘‖ and stating that ―[a] companion dog is not a living
room sofa or dining room furniture‖); Jane Porter, It Can Be a Regular Dog Fight; Family Pets
Involved in a Growing Number of Custody Cases, HARTFORD COURANT, July 10, 2006, at D1
(stating that in courts, ―pets are still considered property, no different from the silverware, the
plasma TV and the living-room sofa‖).
85. Sylvia Cochran, Who Will Take Care of Your Pet If You Die or Become Incapacitated?,
(Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2790940/basic_estate_planning_for_
pets.html.
86. CONGALTON & ALEXANDER, supra note 72, at 67 (―Animals, by law, are property, and one
piece of property cannot own another piece of property . . . .‖); Neil E. Hendershot, What the
General Practitioner Needs to Know About Pennsylvania Animal Law (Part II): Personal and
Estate Planning for Pennsylvanians Owning Pets, 77 PA. B. ASS‘N Q. 107, 115 (2006) (―[I]t is
axiomatic under Pennsylvania law that property cannot own property. Therefore, a pet cannot
inherit property.‖).
87. In re Estate of Russell, 444 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1968). The case appears in many leading
Trusts and Estates casebooks. See, e.g., CASES AND MATERIALS ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: WILLS,
INTESTATE SUCCESSION, TRUSTS, GIFTS, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 388–93
(Elias Clark et al. eds., 5th ed. 2007); WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 359–63 (Jesse Dukeminier et al.
eds., 8th ed. 2009).
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own Real & Personal to Chester H. Quinn & Roxy Russell.‘‖ On the
back side, she bequeathed her ―‗Ten dollar gold Piece & diamonds‘‖ to her
niece, Georgia.89 Thelma also left an address book in which she had
written: ―‗Chester, Don‘t Let Augusta and Georgia have one penny of my
place if it takes it all to fight it in Court.‘‖90 Unfortunately, Roxy Russell
turned out to be Thelma‘s pet Airedale dog. The California Supreme Court
declared Roxy‘s share of the residue void because ―a dog cannot be the
beneficiary under a will.‖91 As a result, Roxy‘s share passed by intestacy to
none other than Georgia, Thelma‘s sole intestate heir.
A legacy to a pet may have even more far-reaching consequences. It
may lead to invalidation of the entire will on grounds of testamentary
incapacity.92 As the trial court in Estate of Russell observed, ―To ascribe to
her the belief that her dog could acquire real property with all the rights
and obligations incident to ownership is to describe a person who would
probably be incompetent to make a will at all.‖93 Indeed, will contestants
have even gone so far as to cite a testator‘s indulgence of pets as evidence
of mental incompetence.94 For example, a New York son argued that the
fact that his father ―insisted upon a cat eating at the table with him, for
which a place and chair were reserved‖ indicated that his father was ―in a
very weak condition.‖95 Similarly, North Carolina nephews cited as
evidence of their aunt‘s mental capacity:
That she kept her dogs in the room with her. ―They had a
bed and she had one.‖ She prepared for the dogs like she
would one of the family; made cakes for them and bought
candy for them and cooked chicken for them, and she cooked
cakes for the dogs [sic] Christmas.96
88. In re Estate of Russell, 444 P.2d at 355.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 356 n.4.
91. Id. at 363.
92. See CONGALTON & ALEXANDER, supra note 72, at 68 (reporting a case in which a local
community foundation challenged an elderly woman‘s will leaving ―a rather large bequest‖ to
D.E.L.T.A. (Dedication & Everlasting Love To Animals) Rescue in Southern California. The
foundation‘s lawyers successfully ―argu[ed] that leaving money to animals was proof that the
woman had to be crazy‖); see also Lynn Asinof, Bowser‟s Bequest; Your Pets Can‟t Inherit Your
Money, but a Trust Could Provide for Their Care, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 22, 2002, Business Section,
at 1 (stating that ―no one should leave millions to their pet, or there may be ‗an appearance that this
person could be mentally unbalanced . . .‘‖ (quoting attorney Kenneth P. Brier)).
93. See WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, supra note 87, at 361 n.15 (quoting the trial court).
94. Admittedly, in some cases, a testator‘s treatment of pets in fact suggests lack of capacity.
For example, in Davis v. Laughlin, will contestants presented evidence that the testator lacked
mental capacity, which included ―her washing her dog in the kitchen sink and putting it in her bed
and sleeping with it without so much as drying it; [] keeping the dog in her room and bed without
letting it out until it soiled them; [and] tying her dog and cat together and then fastening the string
to her ankle.‖ Davis‘ Ex‘r v. Laughlin, 133 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Ky. 1939).
95. Eckert v. Page, 146 N.Y.S. 513, 517 (App. Div. 1914).
96. In re Hargrove‘s Will, 173 S.E. 577, 578 (N.C. 1934). For more sympathetic judicial
treatment of a testator‘s indulgence of pets, see Smith v. Smith, 47 S.W.2d 1036, 1039 (Ky. 1932)
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While direct legacies to pets are relatively rare, other testamentary
arrangements for the care of pets are not. The most popular of these
arrangements―trusts for pets―will be discussed below.97 Yet, these
arrangements too have failed to ensure a secure future for a decedent‘s
nonhuman loved ones. As one commentator observed, ―Historically, the
approach of most American courts towards bequests for the care of specific
animals has not been calculated to gladden the hearts of animal lovers.‖98
A common technique has been for a testator to leave cash, personal
property, and/or a house99 to a trusted friend,100 relative,101 employee,102 or
animal welfare organization103 subject to a stipulation that the legatee
provide lifetime care for the testator‘s pet(s).104 In some cases, these
arrangements involve specific pets. For example, Mary Johnston left to her
employee, Harris Stanford, her horses, ―Bessie‖ and ―Daisy,‖ their saddles,
harness, and other equipment, and $14,000.105 She stated that it was her
―‗wish and direction‘‖ that Stanford apply the cash and any income ―‗to the
care and maintenance of the said two (2) mares, according to his judgment
(―Doubtless there are many to whom the presence of dogs is offensive, but it would be going far
afield to say that a childless old man was incapable of making a will because he loved dogs,
permitted them to enter his room and jump upon his bed, when they came to his door, and, as he
expressed it, ‗begged to be let in.‘‖); In re Van Den Heuvel‘s Will, 136 N.Y.S. 1109, 1122–23 (Sur.
Ct. 1912) (characterizing the testator‘s ―exaggerated affection for her parrot‖ as an ―eccentricity‖
rather than evidence of mental incapacity).
97. See infra Part II.B.2.
98. Barbara W. Schwartz, Estate Planning for Animals, 113 TR. & EST. 376, 376 (1974).
99. The testator should also bequeath the pet to the chosen caretaker. Otherwise the pet would
be part of the testator‘s general estate.
100. See, e.g., In re Andrews‘ Will, 228 N.Y.S.2d 591, 592 (Sur. Ct. 1962) (quoting the will of
Jennie M. Andrews, which provided: ―‗I give to Lucretia Shaffer $500.00, but as a condition of the
legacy, require her to give my dog good care as long as the dog lives.‘‖); Stever v. Holt, 100 P.2d
1016, 1022 (Ore. 1940) (involving will leaving the testator‘s house to Pearl Holt ―‗on the condition
that the said Pearl Holt move into and make her home in the above-mentioned house and provide
and care for the little dog Beauty and the cat Cutey‘‖).
101. See, e.g., In re Meyer‘s Will, 236 N.Y.S.2d 12, 13 (Sur. Ct. 1962) (involving will leaving
money to the testator‘s niece with the ―‗request that she take care of my pet cat ―OLLIE‖ during it‘s
[sic] lifetime‘‖); In re Kieffer Estate, 21 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 406, 406 (Orphans‘ Ct. 1971) (involving
will leaving the testator‘s estate to her niece ―to be used for Gigi and Diedrie two poodles to be used
to take care of them and their puppies born up to the present time‖).
102. See, e.g., In re Johnston‘s Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221–22 (App. Div. 1950) (involving
codicil leaving, inter alia, $14,000 to the testator‘s employee with the ―‗wish and direction‘‖ that he
use it for the care of her two horses).
103. See, e.g., Waldecker v. Pfefferle, No. E-02-002, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 6016, at *4 (Ct.
App. Nov. 8, 2002) (involving will leaving the testator‘s entire estate to the ―‗Erie County Humane
Society . . . . [and] direct[ing] that the Erie County Humane Society shall out of the proceeds of my
estate, pay for the proper care and veterinary service of my Siamese cat, SINBAD, for the remainder
of its natural life‘‖).
104. For extended discussion of U.S. judicial approaches to conditional bequests and other
types of will provisions that leave property to a legatee with a pet care stipulation, see Beyer, supra
note 78, at 640–46; Cave, supra note 78, at 637–40.
105. In re Johnston‟s Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d at 221–22.
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and without restriction.‘‖
In other cases, the will contains a broad, catch-all category. For
instance, Anna Filkins left her automobile, house, and household
furnishings to her sister-in-law, Lottie, ―‗expressly contingent upon
[Lottie] furnishing proper care for any and all pets which [Anna] may own
at the time of [her] decease for as long as they shall live.‘‖107
Unfortunately, Anna Filkins‘ and Mary Johnston‘s efforts to provide
for their nonhuman survivors ultimately failed. The court ruled that
Filkins‘ condition violated New York perpetuities law and awarded Lottie
Filkins the property free and clear of any obligation to care for any
surviving pets.108 Mary Johnston‘s effort proved equally unsuccessful. The
court recognized that her intent was ―to insure a good home for her horses,
and no doubt she expected her friend to utilize so much of the gift as he
might deem necessary for that purpose.‖109 Nonetheless, it concluded that
the particular wording of provision made care of Bessie and Daisy merely
―precatory rather than mandatory.‖ Indeed, the court indicated that even if
Stanford had chosen to ―dispose of [the horses] the very day he received
the bequest,‖110 he would still inherit.
A close analysis of judicial decisions exposes a disturbing pattern of
courts reading even the strongest language to favor a human legatee at the
expense of the decedent‘s pets. A Washington case is illustrative. Anna
Bradley left the residue of her estate to her ―‗dear friend and companion
Hattie M. Peterson‘‖ and stated ―‗she must take good care of my dear cats,
Sister, Daddy Bimbow, Jimmy John and Tricksey.‘‖111 The court
acknowledged that Bradley‘s direction was ―imperatively worded.‖112 Yet,
like the Johnston court, this court too interpreted the language to be
precatory only. As a result, Hattie Peterson received the residue without
any legal obligation to care for Bradley‘s cats. As for Sister, Daddy
Bimbow, Jimmy John, and Tricksey, their fate was left to Peterson‘s
―discretion and good will.‖113 The cats could only hope that Bradley‘s faith
that ―her dear friend and companion [would] . . . comply with her request,
or command,‖114 was not, in fact, misplaced.
Judicial interpretation of pet care provisions can lead to truly perverse
results. For example, in a 1993 Pennsylvania case, Mamie Myrtle Bloch

106. Id.
107. In re Filkins‘ Will, 120 N.Y.S.2d 124, 125 (Sur. Ct. 1952).
108. Id. at 126 (―Since the condition is based upon the lives of several animals, it clearly is
void under the statute against unlawful suspension of the power of alienation.‖).
109. In re Johnston‟s Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
110. Id. In fact, the horses were ―disposed of‖ prior to Johnston‘s death. Less than five months
after she wrote her codicil, Johnston was ―declared incompetent and a committee [was] appointed
who subsequently disposed of the horses and the equipment for $175.00.‖ Id. at 222. Johnston died
twenty years later, ―still an incompetent.‖ Id.
111. In re Bradley‘s Estate, 59 P.2d 1129, 1130–31 (Wash. 1936).
112. Id. at 1131.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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left her estate in equal shares to her lawyer‘s father and ―paramour.‖115 The
will stated that the two legatees ―‗have agreed to care for my dog and cats
for as long as said shall live.‘‖116 The two legatees never took care of the
animals. Yet, they ended up with Bloch‘s estate. The court read the
language ―agreed to care for‖ as simply an explanation of the ―motivation
for wanting to make the gift to the legatees‖ rather than a condition for
inheritance.117
The next subsection will show that judicial treatment of trusts for pets
is equally troubling. As Professor William Reppy has observed, courts
have invalidated these trusts ―even if the failure of such a trust would
increase the risk that an animal will be put to death when the animal‘s
owner dies.‖118
2. Trusts
Under the family paradigm of inheritance law, decedents have a moral
responsibility to provide for dependent and vulnerable members of their
immediate family.119 Trusts are supposed to be the ideal mechanism to
protect family survivors who cannot support themselves due to age,
disability, inexperience, or improvidence. By ―separat[ing] the benefits of
ownership from the burdens of ownership,‖120 trusts, in the words of the
Restatement, ―provid[e] property management for those who cannot, ought
not, or wish not to manage for themselves.‖121
Yet, if the decedent uses a trust to support the ultimate dependent―a
pet who relied entirely on the decedent for food, shelter, and care―the
trust is not a ―true trust.‖122 At common law, a trust for an animal, even an
animal the decedent called family, is at best an ―‗honorary trust,‘ . . . one
binding the conscience of the trustee‖123 but not legally enforceable.
Just as under the law of wills, pets are not ―natural objects‖ but simply
objects. They are property and are denied the status of beneficiary because

115.
116.
117.
118.

In re Bloch, 625 A.2d 57, 58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
Id. at 59.
Id. at 62.
William A. Reppy, Jr., Estate Planning to Provide for the Post-Death Care of Pets, in
ANIMAL LAW AND THE COURTS: A READER 217, 217 (Taimie L. Bryant et al. eds., 2008).
119. Friedman, supra note 34, at 358 (―The basic family unit in the United States is the nuclear
family (husband, wife, and children). The head of the family has an obligation to support, educate,
and care for his dependents; he has a moral obligation to make provision for them in the event of his
death.‖). As I have argued elsewhere, under the family paradigm, ―the American inheritance
system . . . . promote[s] support but limits its protections once again principally to the ‗natural
objects of the decedent‘s bounty,‘ the decedent‘s closest surviving family members.‖ Foster, Family
Paradigm, supra note 16, at 219.
120. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 1 (4th
ed. 1987).
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 cmt. b(1) (2001).
122. Phillips v. Estate of Holzmann, 740 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (―A trust of this sort
is not a true trust.‖).
123. In re Searight‘s Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779, 781 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss4/1

16

Foster: Should Pets Inherit?

2011]

SHOULD PETS INHERIT?

817

124

they have no legal standing to enforce a trust. Similarly, because pets are
not human, they do not qualify as ―measuring lives‖ to prevent application
of the rule against perpetuities.125 A person the decedent has never
met―Queen Victoria‘s descendant, for instance126―counts as a measuring
life. A pet who shared the decedent‘s life does not. Once again, when
courts define pets as property, the animals come out the losers.127
Consider, for example, a Pennsylvania case. In 1946, John Renner, an
unmarried retired policeman, died, survived by his dog and parrot, niece
and nephew, and close friend, Mary Riesing.128 Renner‘s will bequeathed
his pets129 and the residue of his estate to Riesing in trust ―‗for the
maintenance of my pets, which I leave to her kind care and judgment, and
for their interment upon their respective deaths in the Francisvale
Cemetery.‘‖130 The court declared the trust invalid because there was no
beneficiary ―who could call her to account.‖131 As a result, Riesing ended
up with the pets and a substantial inheritance. The dog and parrot became
her property, their very existence dependent upon ‗―her kind care and
judgment.‘‖
As countless pets have discovered, the rule against perpetuities132 has
posed a particular threat to their well-being. Estate of Baier133 is
illustrative. In 1939, Louise Baier, an elderly recluse, died. She had no
living relatives. The ―chief if not only object of her affections‖134 was her
cat, Tommy Tucker. Her will and codicil left $5,000 in trust ―‗to pay the
net income therefrom for the care, maintenance, and burial of my pet and

124. 1 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 17.21
(Anderson Publ‘g 2003) (1963) (stating that in the case of trusts for animals ―[i]t is obvious that no
beneficiary exists to enforce the trust and to compel the trustee to carry out the trust. Since trusts are
usually defined in terms of the existence of a beneficiary and of enforceability, it may be better to
refer to these as honorary trusts, or unenforceable trusts‖).
125. In re Mills‘ Estate, 111 N.Y.S.2d 622, 625 (Sur. Ct. 1952) (stating that the phrases ―‗lives
in being‘ and ‗persons in being‘ as used in the statutes of perpetuities refer to human beings‖ and
holding that a trust for the care of the decedent‘s pets was invalid because it ―was intended to be
measured by the lives of animals and not human beings‖).
126. See WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, supra note 87, at 898 (―[T]he English solicitors
developed a royal lives saving clause whereby the trust is to continue until 21 years after the death
of all the descendants of Queen Victoria . . . living at the creation of the trust.‖).
127. Reppy, supra note 118, at 218.
128. In re Renner‘s Estate, 57 A.2d 836, 837 (Pa. 1948).
129. Id. at 837. He also left her his ―‗home and garage . . . together with the entire contents
thereof . . . and [his] flower garden . . . .‘‖ Id. (quoting Renner‘s will).
130. Id. (quoting Renner‘s will).
131. Id. at 838.
132. This includes local perpetuities statutes like New York‘s statute requiring that ―absolute
ownership of property shall not be suspended for a period longer than during the continuance, and
until the termination, of not more than two lives in being at the death of the testator.‖ In re Howells‘
Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 598, 602–03 (Sur. Ct. 1932) (summarizing the New York statute).
133. Bequests for the Care of Animals, 74 N.Y. L. REV. 430, 430–31 (1940) (discussing the
1940 New York case of Estate of Baier).
134. Id. at 430.
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cat named ‗Tommy Tucker.‘‖135 Upon the cat‘s death, the remainder of the
trust was to go to various institutions, including an animal hospital. No one
challenged the validity of the income provision.136 Indeed, the remainder
beneficiaries stated that they wanted the income to be spent on the cat‘s
care. Yet, when the executors filed their account with the Surrogate‘s
Court, the court declared the provision void on grounds that under New
York perpetuities law, ―‗equitable and legal estates are limited to the lives
of human beings.‘‖137 Where or even if Tommy Tucker lived out the rest of
his nine lives was irrelevant.
Perpetuities rules have frustrated even the clearest expression of
testamentary intent. For example, in another New York case,138 Camille
Howells, like John Renner and Louise Baier, attempted to use a
testamentary trust to provide a secure future for her two cats and three
dogs. Howells was estranged from her husband and her sister, her ―sole
next of kin,‖ and, as the court later put it, ―[t]he place in her affections
usually occupied by family or relatives seem[ed] to have been taken by
pets.‖139 Howells died with a will, which was ―apparently a homemade
affair.‖140 The will disinherited the husband and sister and left the residue
of Howells‘ estate in trust to provide ―‗for the care, comfort and
maintenance of my pet animals.‘‖141 The court acknowledged that Howells
was closer to her pets than to her human family members and that her
intent was clear. The court stated: ―[T]he conclusion is inescapable that her
dominant testamentary desire was to provide for the care and welfare of her
pet animals who constituted her sole immediate family.‖142 Nonetheless,
Howells‘ efforts to provide for her beloved pets after her death were in
vain. The court found the trust void under New York perpetuities law.
Howells‘ estate went by intestate succession to the very next of kin she had
expressly disinherited in her will. Her pets were left to fend for themselves.
Thus, the family paradigm‘s definition of ―natural objects‖ trumped
Howells‘ actual relationships with her human and nonhuman family
members.
3. Contracts to Devise
In a 1970 opinion, a Kentucky court stated that ―contracts to pay people
for caring for dogs after the owners‘ deaths are rare.‖143 However, if
reported cases are any guide, many Americans make just such
arrangements to protect nonhuman loved ones in the event of their owners‘
135. Id. (quoting Baier‘s will).
136. Id. The issue was whether the executors and trustees could invade principal to reimburse a
veterinary surgeon for costs incurred in caring for Tommy Tucker. Id.
137. Id. at 431 (quoting the opinion).
138. In re Howells‘ Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 598 (Sur. Ct. 1932).
139. Id. at 600–01.
140. Id. at 601.
141. Id. (quoting Howells‘ will).
142. Id. at 602.
143. Veluzat v. Janes, 462 S.W.2d 194, 200 (Ky. 1970).
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disability or death. These arrangements often take the form of an oral
contract to devise between the decedent and a trusted relative,144 friend,145
or partner.146 The decedent agrees to leave all or part of her estate to the
chosen caregiver in exchange for that individual‘s promise to care for the
decedent‘s pet.
Two California cases are illustrative. In Collins v. McIlhany, a
―professional comedian and comedy writer,‖147 Harrison Baker, promised
to leave actress Ruth Collins the Rodeo Drive house she had been renting
from him for several years.148 In return, she agreed to perform various
services, including ―providing a lifetime of care for Baker‘s beloved dog
Rusty.‖149
In Roy v. Salisbury, Edward Drucks used a similar mechanism to
ensure that Mike, the doberman pinscher for whom he ―had a great
affection,‖ received care if ―‗Drucks ever became unable to care for said
dog, or, if he should die.‘‖150 Drucks made an oral contract with C.A. Roy,
the breeder, trainer, and kennel owner who had originally sold Mike to
Drucks. Roy agreed that Mike would be ―housed, fed and cared for by
[Roy] for the remainder of said dog‘s life.‖151 In exchange, Drucks
promised that Roy would receive his ―usual rate for boarding and caring
for Doberman Pinschers.‖152
Rusty and Mike were probably lucky.153 After Baker‘s and Drucks‘
deaths, courts awarded the caregivers money for the care of the dogs.154
144. See, e.g., In re Estate of Braaten, Probate No. DP 02-33, 2003 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1439,
at *1–4, *7 (D. Ct. Mar. 6, 2003), rev‟d, In re Estate of Braaten, 96 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Mont. 2004)
(involving a contract to devise with the decedent‘s stepson for services, which included ―tak[ing]
care of the dog, including feeding the dog, watering the dog, taking the dog to the vet and watching
him while [the decedent] traveled‖).
145. See, e.g., Estate of Brenzikofer, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401, 403 (Ct. App. 1996) (involving a
contract to devise with the decedent‘s friends, in which ―decedent made a promise to them that she
would will them the house they were renting if appellants would agree to care for her and her cats‖).
Such contracts are often made with caregivers for the decedent as well as for the decedent‘s pets.
See, e.g., Martin v. Turner, 218 S.E.2d 789, 790 (Ga. 1975) (involving ―an alleged oral contract
between plaintiff and the deceased by which the deceased agreed to provide for plaintiff in his
will . . . in return for her taking the deceased into her home, providing and caring for him for life,
and caring for his dog‖).
146. See, e.g., In re Estate of Payne, 895 A.2d 428, 430 (N.J. 2006) (involving a claim by the
decedent‘s partner that the decedent had promised to leave him his New Jersey house to provide a
home for the partner and the decedent‘s dogs after the decedent‘s death).
147. Brief for Appellant-Petitioner at 2, Collins v. McIlhany, No. BC346013 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 11, 2008) (―Harrison Baker Jr. was a professional comedian and comedy writer since the
1960s.‖).
148. Collins v. McIlhany, No. B200696, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9676, at *1–2, *4 n.2
(Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2008), review denied, No. S169681, 2009 LEXIS 1528 (Cal. Feb. 25, 2009).
149. Id. at *2.
150. Roy v. Salisbury, 130 P.2d 706, 707 (Cal. 1942).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. This assumes that Collins and Roy in fact cared for the dogs as promised.
154. Roy, 130 P.2d at 707–08, 712; Collins, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9676, at *1.
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Unfortunately, however, these cases are exceptional.
Oral contracts to devise are even less likely than wills and trusts to
guarantee a secure future for a decedent‘s pets. American inheritance law
disfavors contracts to devise between decedents and caregivers.155 In a
recent case that included a provision for care of the decedent‘s cat, a New
York court underscored this hostility toward contracts to devise.156 It stated
that ―claims made after death are viewed with great suspicion and tend to
negate the existence of an implied contract because contradiction by the
decedent is impossible.‖157
As a result, courts have imposed strict evidentiary standards for
enforcement of such contracts.158 For example, in Todd v. Hyzer, a Florida
couple (the Todds) claimed that their landlord, Clara Zearing, had
promised to leave them the house they rented from her in exchange for
providing various services, including care of the cat of which ―she was
inordinately fond.‖159 The court denied their claim on grounds that the
Todds failed to establish the contract ―by definite and unequivocal
testimony.‖160 Other courts have required clear and convincing evidence of
the contract.161 At least one court has suggested that oral contracts for the
care of a decedent‘s pet may actually require stronger evidence than
applied to more conventional contracts to devise.162
Local dead man‘s statutes have created further evidentiary problems.
These statutes may exclude the only evidence that an oral contract in fact
exists. The Kentucky case quoted above163 is illustrative. A young couple
(the Pirrmans) asserted that they had an oral express contract with their
now-deceased friend and neighbor, Lonnie Bradley.164 According to the
Pirrmans, they had agreed that, after Bradley‘s death, they would care for
his beloved pet chihuahua for the remainder of the dog‘s life. In return,
155. Craddock v. Berryman, 645 P.2d 399, 402 (Mont. 1982) (―Contracts to make wills are
looked upon with disfavor . . . .‖); Bentzen v. Demmons, 842 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Wash. Ct. App.
1993) ( ―While equity will recognize oral contracts to devise, such contracts are not favored . . . .‖);
see Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 215–18 (discussing the negative treatment of
contracts to devise between decedents and caregivers).
156. Estate of Truitt, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4818, at *1–2 (Sur. Ct. 2005).
157. Id. at *4.
158. See Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 216 & n.76 (discussing high evidentiary
standards for contracts to devise).
159. Todd v. Hyzer, 18 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1944).
160. Id. at 890–91.
161. See, e.g., Collins v. McIlhany, No. B200696, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9676, at *9
(Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2008), review denied, No. S169681, 2009 LEXIS 1528 (Cal. Feb. 25, 2009) (―To
prevail, Collins had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Baker made an oral
promise to leave her the Rodeo Drive property as ‗compensation for services rendered, or to be
rendered . . . .‘‖ (quoting Drvol v. Bant, 183 Cal. App. 2d 351, 356 (Ct. App. 1960) (internal
citation omitted))).
162. Veluzat v. Janes, 462 S.W.2d 194, 200 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970) (―[S]ince contracts to pay
people for caring for dogs after the owners‘ deaths are rare, we think it would take a fairly strong
inference to warrant a finding of the existence of such a contract.‖).
163. Veluzat v. Janes, 462 S.W.2d 194 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
164. Id. at 195–97.
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Bradley promised to pay them the ―reasonable value of such services.‖
The Pirrmans took the chihuahua into their home166 and filed a claim
against Bradley‘s estate for the estimated value of dog care services.
Unfortunately for the couple, their key evidence―Mrs. Pirrman‘s own
testimony regarding the terms of the contract―was inadmissible under
Kentucky‘s dead man‘s statute. Not surprisingly, the court concluded that
the Pirrmans lacked sufficient evidence of a ―contractual understanding‖
with Bradley and dismissed the claim.
The statute of frauds has been another threat to decedents‘ efforts to
provide for their nonhuman loved ones by contract. Consider, for instance,
a surprisingly common scenario: an oral contract in which the decedent
promises to leave her house to her pet‘s future caregiver.167 Under nearly
every jurisdiction‘s statute of frauds, that contract is legally unenforceable
because a contract to convey real property must be in writing.168 The
caregiver‘s only possible remedy lies in equity. Thus, in the Collins case,169
Ruth Collins (and Rusty?) did not end up in the Beverly Hills house (worth
$2.2 million) Baker promised her.170 She did, however, recover in quantum
meruit the value of her services―$111,124.171
The statute of frauds may frustrate a decedent‘s plans in another
context as well―when an oral contract involves care of a pet only after the
decedent‘s death. Thus, in the Roy case,172 the court conceded that Drucks‘
contract to provide for his beloved doberman would have failed if the ―sole
provision of the contract was for the care of the dog in the event of
decedent‘s death.‖173 In that situation, ―it would be a contract not to be
performed during the lifetime of decedent, promisor, and therefore
condemned by the statute of frauds.‖174 In the actual case, however, the
court was able to effectuate Drucks‘ intent because ―death was not the sole
alternative‖175 in the contract at issue. The contract also provided for
Mike‘s care if Drucks ―became unable‖ to do so.176 Since the contract
could conceivably have been performed during Drucks‘ lifetime, the statute
of frauds did not apply.
165. Id. at 196.
166. Mrs. Pirrman actually ―took the dog and thereafter cared for it‖ after the death of
Bradley‘s wife, who predeceased him. Id. at 200.
167. See supra notes 145, 159–60 and accompanying text (discussing two examples of such
cases, Estate of Brenzikofer and Todd v. Hyzer).
168. Veluzat, 462 S.W.2d at 196 (stating that oral express contracts are not enforceable under
the statute of frauds ―if they embrace real estate‖); see WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, supra note 87,
at 548, 595 (stating that ―the Statute of Frauds in virtually every state prevents the enforcement‖ of
an oral express trust where the owner of real property conveys land).
169. See supra notes 147–49, 153–54 and accompanying text (discussing Collins v. McIlhany).
170. Collins v. McIlhany, No. B200696, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9676, at *2 (Ct. App.
Dec. 2, 2008), review denied, No. S169681, 2009 LEXIS 1528 (Cal. Feb. 25, 2009).
171. Id. at *4–5.
172. See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text (discussing Roy v. Salisbury).
173. Roy v. Salisbury, 130 P.2d 706, 709 (Cal. 1942).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 707.
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Finally, even a decedent‘s efforts to put a pet care contract in writing
may fail if the decedent does not comply with contractual formalities.
Consider, for example, Maggie Goodwin‘s attempt to provide for her dog,
Madam Shan.177 Goodwin gave her friend, Charlie Dailey, a check for
$7,000 to be paid ―‗from my estate as mentioned in letter‘‖ and a written
document stating:
―I Maggie M. Goodwin of sound mind do hereby
artharize [sic] Charlie Dailey to rite [sic] this check on me for
$7,000.00 to bee [sic] paid out of my estate to Charlie Dailey
and he is to care for my dog Madam Shan for her lifetime and
beried [sic] in a pine box at the foot of my grave . . . .‖178
Unfortunately, Goodwin‘s plans for Madam Shan‘s future were
unsuccessful. In Dailey v. Adams, an Arkansas court held that she did not
create a valid contract because Dailey did not sign the document or provide
any consideration.179 As a result, Dailey ―was not entitled to the money and
thus could not carry out the owner‘s intent regarding Madam Shan.‖180 In
the end, then, Madam Shan was the real loser. She―like so many pets
decedents thought they had protected―could only hope that someone
would care for her pro bono.
4. Execution Defects
Dailey v. Adams illustrates how legal formalities can be a trap for the
unwary pet owner and can doom a nonhuman loved one to an uncertain
future. This problem is by no means limited to the contractual context.
Indeed, according to the court, Maggie Goodwin‘s arrangement for Madam
Shan‘s care failed on all counts.181 It did not comply with the requirements
for wills, inter vivos gifts, gifts causa mortis, or contracts.182 Goodwin‘s
legal expertise (or lack thereof) was irrelevant. So too was her intent and
her relationship with Madam Shan. As for Madam Shan, the court did not
even acknowledge that its decision would likely compromise the dog‘s
chances for a long and happy life.
Other pets have suffered a similar fate. Even the most minor execution
defects have defeated decedents‘ efforts to ensure a secure future for their
nonhuman survivors. For example, Timothy Saueressig‘s will183 with its
directions regarding care of his ―‗family‘‖―his four cats―was denied
probate because only one of two witnesses signed the will.184 Mary
177. Dailey v. Adams, 319 S.W.2d 34, 35–36 (Ark. 1958).
178. Id. at 35–36.
179. Id. at 36.
180. Beyer, supra note 78, at 634 (discussing Dailey v. Adams).
181. Dailey, 319 S.W.2d at 36–37.
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text (discussing Estate of Saueressig).
184. Estate of Saueressig, 136 P.3d 201, 202, 209 & n.11 (Cal. 2006). Saueressig had a notary
public notarize the execution of his will. Id. at 202. ―[T]he only reasonable inference to be drawn
from the decedent‘s conduct is that he believed the notarization would validate his will.‖ Id. at 202
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Kleinman‘s handwritten document, providing a $30,000 trust and lengthy
list of instructions for the care of her cat, Troy, failed as well because it
disposed of money rather than personal property.185 Frederick and Bertha
Leibolds‘ efforts to ensure ―faithful and loving care‖ for their bulldog,
Peggy, was equally unsuccessful.186 Although their will was titled ―Joint
Will and Testament,‖ a Colorado court rejected it due to insufficient proof
that the couple had agreed to make ―mutual wills.‖187
In many cases, a pet ends up unprotected simply because the decedent
was a layperson unfamiliar with legal requirements. Consider, for example,
Beatrice Katz‘s attempt to provide for D.D., the ―feline friend who sat at
her side.‖188 In 1988, Katz, a frugal retired secretary with a knack for
―shrewd investments,‖189 executed a will. The will left the bulk of her
estate in trust for her then-living cat, Blackie, with the remainder to go, if
Blackie predeceased Katz, to twenty charities. Blackie subsequently died
and Katz adopted D.D. One day, she decided to update her will to provide
for D.D. She took out the will and ―scratched out all references to ‗Blackie‘
and simply left references to her ‗cat.‘‖190 Unfortunately for D.D., Katz did
not know that, under Florida law, to change her will she had to re-execute
it in accordance with statutory requirements. Thus, her handwritten
changes were effectively ―invisible.‖191 After Katz‘s death, the charities
rather than D.D. were entitled to her estate.192
At worst, a decedent‘s failure to understand, let alone comply with,
execution requirements can result in her property and even her pets going
to the very people she does not want to benefit. In re Estate of Tyrrell193 is
illustrative. Mary Tyrrell handwrote a will on note paper. On the first page,
below an embossed coat of arms, she stated: ―‗This is my last and only
Will.‘‖194 She then set out on three pages how she wanted her real and
personal property distributed. She left nearly her entire estate to the
―‗Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in Phoenix or in other
words . . . the Humane Society‘‖ and directed: ―‗All pet dumb animals that
I leave are to be taken the best care of till they die a natural death and I
n.3. The notary‘s husband heard Saueressig ask the notary to notarize the will, saw Saueressig sign
the will, and saw the notary notarize the will and was ―ready and willing to sign the will as a
witness‖ after Saueressig‘s death. Id. at 202–03.
185. In re Estate of Kleinman, 970 P.2d 1286, 1287–89 (Utah 1998).
186. Ireland v. Jacobs, 163 P.2d 203, 204 (Colo. 1945).
187. Id. at 204, 208.
188. Jim Ross, A Frugal Life Turns Up Unexpected Riches, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Oct.
28, 1993, at 12.
189. Id.
190. Id. Katz made other changes as well. For example, her original will left $5,000 to her
neighbors, Leslie and Ruth Carroll, with whom Blackie was going to live. Id. She later changed the
$5,000 legacy to ―balance of my estate.‖ Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. Apparently, the Carrolls were the ultimate ―good neighbors.‖ They were willing to
take care of D.D. and ―refuse[d] to complain or mount a legal challenge.‖ Id.
193. In re Estate of Tyrrell, 153 P. 767 (Ariz. 1915).
194. Id. at 767–68.
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request the officers of the Humane Society to see that my wishes are
faithfully carried out.‘‖195 Tyrrell specifically stated: ―‗I leave nothing to
any person or persons.‘‖196
Tyrrell put the will in an envelope that was ―of the same quality and
color as that of the note paper.‖197 On the envelope, she wrote the
following words: ―‗This is my last and only will. To be opened and acted
upon by the Officers of the Humane Society in Phoenix.‘‖198 She then
made what turned out to be the fatal error. She put her signature on the
envelope but not on the note paper.
After Tyrrell‘s death, her will was denied probate because her
―signature [was] not placed anywhere on the instrument.‖199 The court
acknowledged that the envelope and the will were entirely written by the
deceased as required by Arizona‘s holographic will statute. Moreover, it
conceded that ―[t]he most reasonable inference to be drawn is that she was
unaware of the necessity of signing the paper to give it
authenticity . . . [and] it is most probable that she would have signed the
paper . . . when such an act would have concluded all doubts as to her
intention.‖200 Nonetheless, the court concluded that ―in the absence of a
compliance with the statutory provision in the matter of signing, her
intention to sign cannot be regarded.‖201 As a result, Tyrrell‘s estate,
including her pets, went by intestacy exactly where she did not want it to
go―to the ―persons‖202 the family paradigm declares her natural objects,
Tyrrell‘s ―closest‖ human family members.
III. THE LIMITS OF REFORM STRATEGIES
The failure of American inheritance law to protect decedents‘ pets has
not escaped the notice of legal reformers. Reformers of every
stripe―judges, legislators, lawyers, and scholars alike―have offered three
main strategies to address defects in existing rules and doctrines: (1)
enforcing pet care arrangements on an ad hoc basis; (2) improving legal
mechanisms to provide for decedents‘ pets; and (3) redefining the legal
status of pets. These strategies offer significant improvements over the
current system. Yet, they ultimately provide only partial solutions because
they fail to challenge the family paradigm.

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 768.
Id.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 769.
Id.
Id. at 769–70.
Id. at 768 (quoting Tyrrell‘s will stating ―‗I leave nothing to any person or persons . . .‘‖).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss4/1

24

Foster: Should Pets Inherit?

2011]

SHOULD PETS INHERIT?

825

A. Ad Hoc Judicial Responses
Although courts generally have frustrated decedents‘ efforts to provide
for their nonhuman loved ones,203 a few courts, as Professor Gerry Beyer
has observed, ―have been much kinder to pets and their owners.‖204 Indeed,
some courts have actually praised such efforts. Thus, an Ohio court
described care of a pet dog as a ―worthy purpose.‖205 A Kentucky court
declared ―humane‖206 a will provision that left $1,000 to ensure that the
decedent‘s dog, Dick, ―‗be kept in comfort, . . . [be] well fed, have a bed in
the house by a fire and [be] treated well every day . . . [for] his
lifetime.‘‘‘207 On an ad hoc basis, courts have applied creative reasoning
and remedies to uphold pet care arrangements.208
Searight‟s Estate209 provides a ―textbook example‖210 of this ―kinder
and gentler approach.‖211 George Searight bequeathed his dog, Trixie, to
Florence Hand and directed his executor to deposit $1,000 in a bank ―‗to
be used by him to pay Florence Hand at the rate of 75 cents per day for the
keep and care of [Searight‘s] dog as long as it shall live.‘‖212 As discussed
above,213 most courts would have found this arrangement invalid under the
rule against perpetuities because Searight‘s will used Trixie rather than a
human being as the measuring life. This court, however, saved the
provision for Trixie with a decidedly unorthodox214 approach to the rule
against perpetuities. Applying a ―simple mathematical computation,‖215 the
court calculated that at a rate of seventy-five cents per day, the fund would
203. See supra Part II.B.
204. Beyer, supra note 78, at 635.
205. In re Searight‘s Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779, 782 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950).
206. Willett v. Willett, 247 S.W. 739, 741 (Ky. Ct. App. 1923). This characterization was
important because Kentucky‘s distinctive statute validated ―grants, conveyances, devises,
gifts . . . for any . . . charitable or humane purpose.‖ Id. at 740 (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 739.
208. See, e.g., Beyer, supra note 78, at 635 (stating that courts have validated honorary trusts
as not ―violating the rule against perpetuities, either through the use of creative legal reasoning or
by limiting their duration to twenty-one years‖); Cave, supra note 78, at 641, 645 (referring to
courts‘ ―creative legal reasoning‖ and ―creative jurisprudence in bypassing the [rule against
perpetuities]‖).
209. Searight‟s Estate, 95 N.E.2d at 779.
210. Jennifer R. Taylor, A „Pet‟ Project for State Legislatures: The Movement Toward
Enforceable Pet Trusts in the Twenty-First Century, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 419, 422 (1999).
Searight‟s Estate is literally a ―textbook example.‖ It appears in several Animal Law and Trusts and
Estates casebooks. See, e.g., ANIMAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 609–13 (Sonia S. Waisman et al.
eds., 3d ed. 2006); ANIMAL LAW AND THE COURTS, supra note 118, at 213–16; FAMILY PROPERTY
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 13-46―13-47 (Lawrence
W. Waggoner et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006); WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, supra note 87, at 582–84.
211. CONGALTON & ALEXANDER, supra note 72, at 72.
212. Searight‟s Estate, 95 N.E.2d at 780.
213. See supra notes 132–42 and accompanying text.
214. See WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, supra note 87, at 585 (describing the court‘s approach
as inconsistent ―with the orthodox understanding of the Rule‖).
215. Searight‟s Estate, 95 N.E.2d at 783.
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be exhausted within four years and fifty-seven and a half days.216 Thus, the
court concluded that it was ―very apparent‖ that Searight had ―provided a
time limit . . . much less than the maximum period allowed under the
rule‖―a human life in being plus twenty-one years.217
Pennsylvania courts have proven to be particularly friendly to pet care
arrangements.218 For instance, in a 1979 case, the decedent left the residue
of her estate to her executor in trust ―for the maintenance, care and
feeding‖ of her three cats, Preserved, Marmalade, and Relish.219 The court
acknowledged that the trust could not be given effect because the trust
lacked a beneficiary that could legally enforce the trust. Nonetheless, the
court concluded that the decedent‘s ―four-footed friends‖ should not ―live
the rest of their natural lives without adequate funds.‖220 The solution was
a $5,000 reserve fund, under which the executor would pay the decedent‘s
housekeeper $75 per month to care for the three cats in her home.221
Although this ad hoc judicial approach has achieved justice in
individual cases, it has a serious flaw. It provides no conceptual framework
or uniform rationale for recognizing pet care arrangements.222 Some courts
have enforced such arrangements without providing any explanation
whatsoever for their decisions.223 Other courts have focused on the
wording of the specific instrument at issue. Thus, a Pennsylvania court
stated that in approaching a trust for animals, ―[t]he choice of method in
any case depends upon the language and dispositive provisions of the
will.‖224
Still other courts have emphasized decedent intent. For example, in
Stever v. Holt, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld Catherine Canaris‘ will,
which devised her house to Pearl Holt, a friend she ―regarded . . . as a
daughter,‖225 ―‗on the condition that Pearl Holt move into and make her
216. Id. This was based on a rate of 6% interest per year. Id.
217. See id. (analyzing under RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 374 (1944)).
218. For a review of three such cases, see Beyer, supra note 78, at 637–39.
219. Stewart Estate, 13 Pa. D. & C.3d 488, 489 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1979).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 490. The court drew on Pennsylvania ―precedent for creating a reserve of sufficient
funds for the benefit of the pets, in order to accomplish the intent of the decedent and where the
executrix has agreed to undertake the responsibility.‖ Id.
222. Indeed, in some cases, the court does not even address the provision for the decedent‘s
pet. For example, in Estate of Gonzalez, a Maine court upheld a handwritten will on a preprinted
will form through a liberal interpretation of the state‘s holographic will execution requirements.
Estate of Gonzalez, 855 A.2d 1146, 1150 (Me. 2004). One beneficiary of this decision was the
decedent‘s Jack Russell Terrier, Magnolia. Gonzalez‘s will left Magnolia ―along with $5000 dollars
for the care of said animal‖ to a New Hampshire woman. Id. at 1148.
223. See generally Beyer, supra note 78, at 649 (stating that courts ―have also approved gifts
for the benefit of pet animals without actually stating a legal basis for the approval‖ and citing
examples). In many other cases, courts do not discuss the validity of such gifts ―either because no
one challenges the gift or the issue is not reached for any of a variety of reasons.‖ Id. at 646; see id.
at 646–49 (discussing examples).
224. In re Templeton Estate, 4 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 2d 172, 174 (Orphans‘ Ct. 1984).
225. Stever v. Holt, 100 P.2d 1016, 1023 (Or. 1940).
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home in the above-mentioned house and provide and care for the little dog
Beauty and the cat Cutey.‘‖226 Canaris‘ caregiver claimed she was entitled
to the decedent‘s entire estate under an oral contract to devise made four
years after the will. The court rejected the claim, stressing that ―[i]f the
alleged contract . . . was actually made, this provision for the disposition of
the home and care for the pets, which Mrs. Canaris must have deemed
important, is defeated.‖227
A Pennsylvania court pushed the decedent intent argument even
further.228 The court was presented with Florence Lyon‘s admittedly229
defective attempt to create a testamentary trust to support her dogs and
horses.230 The court first invoked decedent intent to denounce conventional
limits on honorary trusts for animals. It stated: ―The idea that ‗honorary
trusts‘ should be invalid emphasizes form over substance and neglects the
responsibility of the court to ascertain the intent of the testatrix and give
effect to it so far as is possible.‖231 The court then cited Pennsylvania‘s
special commitment to effectuating decedent intent to assert that Lyon‘s
will provisions for her animals ―should be carried out if it can be done.‖232
Finally, the court used decedent intent as a rationale for reducing the
amount Lyon left for care of her dogs and horses from $1.4 million to
$150,000.233 According to the court, the decedent‘s ―actual intent [was]
better served by computing a reasonable figure for such purpose.‖234
Several judicial opinions suggest yet another possible basis for
upholding pet care arrangements―the court‘s attitude toward the parties
involved in the case. This seems to be particularly true in cases involving
oral contracts to devise, where, as a Florida court put it, ―specific
performance is not a matter of right even when the contract is clear and
unambiguous, but a matter of discretion.‖235
Two California appellate decisions illustrate this additional basis.
Estate of Brenzikofer236 featured the ultimate sympathetic plaintiffs, John
and Mary Wright. The Wrights claimed that they had entered into an oral
contract to devise with their friend and landlord, Elnora Brenzikofer. They
stated that, after Brenzikofer became an invalid, she promised to leave
them the house they rented from her in exchange for the Wrights‘
226. Id. at 1022 (quoting Canaris‘ will).
227. Id.
228. In re Lyon Estate, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 474 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1974).
229. Id. at 478 (stating that the trust ―cannot be given effect because testatrix does not name a
person, corporation or association with a beneficial interest capable of enforcing the duties of the
trustee‖).
230. Id. at 475 & n.1 (discussing Lyon‘s will).
231. Id. at 478. In so doing, the court explicitly rejected the ―rule of the Restatement.‖ Id. at
481.
232. Id. at 481.
233. Id. at 482–83. The court concluded that ―testatrix mistook the amount of money necessary
to provide for the animals.‖ Id. at 483.
234. Id.
235. Todd v. Hyzer, 18 So. 2d 888, 891 (Fla. 1944).
236. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401 (Ct. App. 1996).
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agreement to care for her and her cats. After Brenzikofer‘s death, the court
supported their claim for quasi-specific performance. The court
emphasized the Wrights‘ extraordinary ―conduct in failing to move from
the location and in taking care of decedent and her numerous cats over 26
years.‖237 The Wrights fed and cleaned the animals, made special meals for
the cats, and even ―built a facility in their own back yard so as to avoid
placing the cats in a kennel.‖238
In contrast, in the Collins case discussed above,239 the court‘s negative
view of the defendant appeared to be the main basis for upholding Ruth
Collins‘ alleged contract to devise with Harrison Baker. The contract
included provisions for the care of Baker‘s dog, Rusty.240 The court quoted
at length the trial court‘s characterization of the defendant, William
McIlhany, the principal beneficiary of Baker‘s will and trust.241 The trial
court described McIlhany as ―completely lacking in credibility‖ and cited
his ―lack of resources, his history of shrewd manipulation and motive to lie
in th[e] trial . . . [, and] ‗the manner and circumstances under which he
thrust himself into the disposition of Baker‘s property.‘‖242 The court made
particular note of the fact that McIlhany had ―‗personally prepared‘‖
Baker‘s will and trust, which were ―‗only fully executed merely days
before [Baker] died of merkle cell cancer, while Baker was heavily
medicated.‘‖243
Thus, the ad hoc judicial approach ultimately provides uncertain
protection for a decedent‘s nonhuman loved ones. The fate of a decedent‘s
pets depends entirely on whether the court is a friend or foe.244 As the next
section will show, legal practitioners, scholars, and legislators have
responded with more predictable schemes to promote care of a decedent‘s
pets.
B. Efforts to Improve Legal Mechanisms to Protect a Decedent‟s Pets
Reformers have pursued a second strategy to provide enhanced
protection for decedents‘ pets. They have developed testamentary,
nontestamentary, and legislative approaches to minimize judicial
interference with pet care arrangements. Although this strategy can reduce
the impact of family paradigm-based rules of inheritance, it too ultimately
fails to ensure decedents‘ pets a secure future.
237. Id. at 405.
238. Id. at 403.
239. See supra notes 147–49, 154, 169–71 and accompanying text.
240. Collins v. McIlhany, No. B200696, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9676, at *2, 4 (Ct.
App. Dec. 2, 2008), review denied, No. S169681, 2009 LEXIS 1528 (Cal. Feb. 25, 2009).
241. Id. at *6–7. McIlhany, ―a consultant for television programs about the history of magic,‖
id. at *4 n.2, was also the trustee of Baker‘s trust. Id. at *3.
242. Id. at *6 & n.5, *7 n.6 (quoting the trial court).
243. Id. at *2 (quoting the trial court). In contrast, ―[t]he trial court concluded ‗plaintiff [was]
believable and has clearly proven her case.‘‖ Id. at *10 (quoting the trial court).
244. CONGALTON & ALEXANDER, supra note 72, at 65 (titling the chapter ―The Courts: Friend
or Foe?‖).
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1. Testamentary and Nontestamentary Approaches
Estate planning for pets is a booming business.245 Lawyers across the
country report that clients of every demographic and income level
increasingly want to include their nonhuman loved ones in their estate
plans.246 For New Jersey solo practitioner Elenora Benz, pet trusts have
become so popular that they are one of her ―niche areas.‖247 She has
drafted trusts for the care of dogs, cats, horses, boa constrictors, and even a
hedgehog.248 Oregon partner J. Alan Jensen is called the ―pet guy‖ because
of his expertise in estate planning for pets.249 Even lawyers who do not
specialize in pet care issues now ask clients about post-mortem
arrangements for pets and include questions about pets in their preliminary
estate planning checklists and questionnaires.250
Legal practitioners have pursued a common strategy. They have
promoted testamentary and nontestamentary devices to protect a decedent‘s
nonhuman loved ones from the family paradigm-based rules of inheritance.
One approach has been to craft documents that will avoid or at least
minimize the impact of traditional judicial obstacles to enforcement of pet
care arrangements. For instance, in drafting wills, lawyers have taken a
number of precautions to prevent courts from invalidating provisions for
pets. They designate human beings or other legal persons rather than
animals as beneficiaries.251 They limit the amount left for the care of pets
245. This is particularly true in states that have adopted pet trust legislation. Andrew Tran,
Polly Wants an Estate Planner; More People Are Providing for Pets in Their Wills, SUN-SENTINEL
(Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 19, 2007, at 1A (―More people are leaving money for their pets as
states pass laws legalizing pet trusts. As a result, estate lawyers and special animal care
businesses―both big and small―have emerged to cater to pets when their owners die.‖); see also
Rick Miller, Owners Setting Up Their Furred and Feathered Friends for Life; Pet Trusts Are a
Business Opportunity that Financial Advisers May Be Missing, INVESTMENT NEWS, Aug. 15, 2005,
at 3 (―Demand for pet trusts is on the rise . . . .‖).
246. Tracy Carbasho, Pet Issues Becoming Increasingly Important Factor in Estate, Divorce
Settlements, LAW. J., Oct. 10, 2008, at 3 (reporting that ―clients from all demographics and income
brackets express concern about providing for their pets in their will‖).
247. Dick Dahl, Estate Planners Find New Niche: Pet Trusts, ST. LOUIS DAILY RECORD, June
10, 2006, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4185/is_20060610/ai_n16477623/?tag=content;
col1; see also Amy Davidson: Portland Estate Planning Lawyer and Guardianship Attorney, LAW
OFFICES OF NAY & FRIEDENBERG, http://www.naylaw.com/attorneys/amy_davidson.html (last visited
Mar. 7, 2011) (hosting Portland law firm‘s Web site stating that the firm‘s attorney Amy Davidson
―has developed a special expertise in pet trusts and planning for our animal-loving clients‖).
248. Dahl, supra note 247.
249. Asinof, supra note 92.
250. See, e.g., Rachel Hirschfeld, Ensure Your Pet‟s Future: Estate Planning for Owners and
Their Animal Companions, 9 MARQ. ELDER‘S ADVISOR 155, 162 (2007) (stating that practioners
should ―add the question, ‗Do you have a pet?‘‖ to their ―intake questionnaire‖); Estate Plan
Questionnaire, LAW OFFICE OF NICOLE A. DAVIDSON, http://www.nicoledavidsonlaw.com/uploads/
Estate_Plan_Questionnaire.rev7.17.09.pdf (last updated July 17, 2009) (―9. Do you have any pets
that should be included in your estate plan?‖).
251. See, e.g., Stephanie B. Casteel, Estate Planning for Pets, PROB. & PROP., Nov.–Dec.
2007, at 9 (stating that outright gifts to pets are not valid because an animal is property and offering
clients two alternatives: ―a direct gift of a pet, as well as a cash bequest to defray the costs of care,
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to avoid the ‗―appearance that [the donor] could be mentally
unbalanced.‘‖252 Some legal professionals have specifically addressed the
traditional problems with judicial interpretation of conditional bequests.
For example, Professor Gerry Beyer suggests that testators clarify in their
wills whether they want their pet‘s caregiver to ―receive[] the property only
if the caregiver actually cares for the animal.‖253
Lawyers have also focused on the risks of the rule against perpetuities.
Thus, Boston lawyer Kenneth Brier offers the following clause to ensure
that a pet trust complies with the rule against perpetuities: ―The trust under
this Article [trust for pets] shall terminate upon the earlier of (1) the death
of the survivor of all of the animals identified in [cite paragraph] or (2) the
expiration of twenty-one (21) years following the death of the survivor of
[original individual trustees and/or animal caretakers] . . . .‖254
In addition, legal professionals have adopted a second approach to
promote decedents‘ efforts to provide for pets. They have recommended
nontestamentary will substitutes to bypass the family paradigm-oriented
probate system altogether. Proponents argue that revocable trusts are a
particularly useful technique to avoid the costs, delay, and family bias of
the probate system.255 As a result, revocable trusts are becoming the most
popular legal256 device for individuals to leave property to loved
ones―nonhuman as well as human―who do not fit society‘s definitions of
―natural objects of the decedent‘s bounty.‖257
to an individual . . . [or] the client could give an individual or fiduciary the power and discretion to
find a suitable home for the pet‖). Attorney Stephanie Casteel also emphasizes that ―[u]nless a state
has a specific statute, a pet may not be named as the beneficiary of a trust.‖ Id. Her solution is to
designate a ―human caregiver . . . as the beneficiary of a trust and [to] give[] specific duties and
responsibilities for the care of a pet.‖ Id. at 9–10.
252. Asinof, supra note 92 (quoting Kenneth P. Brier).
253. Gerry W. Beyer, Pet Trusts: Fido with a Fortune? 17 (Tex. Tech. Sch. of Law, Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 2010-22), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1519123; see also PEGGY R. HOYT, ALL MY CHILDREN WEAR FUR COATS: HOW TO LEAVE A
LEGACY FOR YOUR PET 94–95 (2008) (discussing conditional bequests).
254. Michael Hayes, When the Client Wants to Leave It to the Cat, J. ACCT., July 2001, at 29,
31 (reproducing Brier‘s sample provision).
255. See, e.g., HOYT, supra note 253, at 75–77 (discussing the use of revocable inter vivos
trusts for care of pets to ―avoid the probate process along with its judicial oversight‖ and stating that
for many individuals probate ―is an expensive, time-consuming and public process‖); Foster, supra
note 18, at 571 (stating that individuals use revocable trusts to ―avoid the costs, strictures, and
family bias of the probate system and give settlors control over their property at death as well as
during life‖).
256. Nonlegal, informal arrangements are likely more common. For example, there may be ―an
‗understanding‘ that a friend, neighbor or relative will care for a dog if the owner can‘t.‖ MARY
RANDOLPH, DOG LAW 10/1 (3d ed. 1997); see also KIMBERLY ADAMS COLGATE, THE PET PLAN AND
PET TRUST GUIDE 41–43 (2008) (stating that most people ―feel they have adequately provided for
their pet by making arrangements (usually a verbal agreement) with a family member or friend to
take their pet when they are gone‖ and detailing the ―countless reasons why this type of agreement
does not provide the security [the] pet needs‖).
257. Susan R. Abert, Pet Trusts: The Uniform Trust Code Gives Enforceability a New Bite,
N.H. B.J., Winter 2006, at 18, 21 (―In New Hampshire, most pet trusts will be drafted as inter vivos
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Some legal professionals and commentators have looked instead to
contractual methods to bypass the probate system. Specifically, they have
recommended lifetime or perpetual care contracts.258 Under these
arrangements, an individual enters into a written agreement with a person
(often a veterinarian)259 or animal care organization to provide lifetime
medical care, food, shelter, and other services for any pets who may
survive her.260 The pet owner makes payment in the form of, for example,
a lump sum amount,261 ―a certain amount as a credit toward expected
services,‖262 life insurance,263 or a pledge to leave a bequest to the
prospective care provider in a will or trust.264 Animal care organizations
take a variety of forms, such as for-profit pet retirement homes, humane
societies, and university veterinary school pet care programs.265
Texas A&M University‘s Stevenson Companion Animal Life-Care
Center is illustrative.266 The Center is located on ten acres and includes a
bird sanctuary, stable, five large fenced yards and even a sunroom for
cats.267 For an upfront enrollment fee of $1,000 per small animal or $2,000
per large animal and a future endowment by will or trust of $50,000 to
$210,000 (depending on the size of the animal and age of the owner),268 pet
trusts, so as to avoid continuing probate court oversight that will occur with a testamentary trust.‖);
Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1375 (stating that reformers ―have shown that will
substitutes, such as revocable trusts, . . . are particularly useful for individuals whose loved ones do
not fit society‘s notion of ‗natural objects of the testator‘s bounty‘‖).
258. Commentators use various names for such arrangements. See, e.g., HOYT, supra note 253,
at 136 (discussing ―perpetual care contract[s] for . . . pet[s]‖); Hirschfeld, supra note 250, at 164–
65 (recommending the ―Hirschfeld Pet Protection Agreement‖); Amber Koehn, Bequeathing Pets
Eases Minds, TOPEKA CAPITAL-J., Sept. 1, 2003, http://cjonline.com/stories/090103/pet_philo.shtml
(discussing the Cat Association of Topeka‘s ―Lifetime Care Contract‖).
259. See CONGALTON & ALEXANDER, supra note 72, at 103–06, 137 (discussing pet care
contracts with veterinarians and providing a sample contract); RANDOLPH, supra note 256, at 10/12–
10/14 (same).
260. This arrangement may also be used for care of pets if the pet owner becomes disabled.
See, e.g., Hirschfeld, supra note 250, at 165 (recommending that a pet owner include in the
agreement a retirement home ―that will care for the pet upon the owner‘s disability or death‖).
261. HOYT, supra note 253, at 128–29; RANDOLPH, supra note 256, at 10/12–10/13.
262. RANDOLPH, supra note 256, at 10/12.
263. Asinof, supra note 92 (stating that some pet owners ―are using life insurance for at least
part‖ of the funding for a pet care arrangement). Kansas State University‘s Perpetual Pet Care
Program specifically permits funding through life insurance. See College of Veterinary Medicine:
Perpetual Pet Care, KAN. STATE UNIV., http://www.vet.ksu.edu/depts/development/perpet/index.
htm (last updated Jan. 14, 2009).
264. See infra text accompanying note 268 (discussing Texas A&M University‘s funding
requirements).
265. For extended summaries of animal care organizations, see CONGALTON & ALEXANDER,
supra note 72, at 91–123; HOYT, supra note 253, at 127–43; LISA ROGAK, PERPETUAL CARE: WHO
WILL LOOK AFTER YOUR PETS IF YOU‘RE NOT AROUND? 25–35, 67–77 (2003).
266. The Center‘s Web site appears at: Stevenson Companion Animal Life-Care Center: Texas
A&M
Veterinary
Medicine
&
Biomedical
Sciences,
TEX.
A&M
UNIV.,
http://www.cvm.tamu.edu/petcare/petcare.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
267. Karen Lee Stevens, „Til Death Do Us Part, CAT WATCH, Apr. 2008, at 10, 11.
268. Stevenson Companion Animal Life-Care Center: Minimum Required Endowment, TEX.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 1

832

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

owners can secure their pets a future home, personal ―wellness‖ program,
special diet, bathing, grooming, daily exercise (complete with ―frisbies,
rope tugs, balls and an array of toys to keep the [animals] and staff
occupied and happy‖),269 and round-the-clock companionship and care
from Texas A&M students.270
Unfortunately, like the ad hoc judicial responses described above, these
testamentary and nontestamentary approaches also fail to ensure adequate
protection for a decedent‘s nonhuman loved ones. By focusing on legal
mechanisms, these approaches reach only a minority of pet owners―those
with the funds and foresight to consult legal professionals. As Professor
Gerry Beyer and his co-author Jonathan Wilkerson recently observed, the
need for ―carefully crafted‖ pet care documents and devices has ―limited
the ability of many clients, especially those with modest estates, to provide
for their beloved companions.‖271 Because of the sheer complexity272 of
these arrangements, even how-to guides for lay pet owners emphasize that
those individuals should avoid do-it-yourself plans and consult a trained
legal professional.273 Yet, this has turned out to be easier in theory than in
practice. The pet owner must locate a competent estate planner with
specific experience in pet care arrangements.274 Fraud has been a particular
problem. Indeed, one author warned her readers that ―there are many
business and salespeople masquerading as estate planning professionals
[who] are inundating the public with sales schemes that involve selling
wills, living trusts and other estate planning documents without the
involvement of attorneys in the counseling, design and drafting of the
documents.‖275
Another obstacle is psychological. Pet owners must confront their own
mortality to plan for the care of a pet after their death.276 In a recent survey
A&M UNIV., http://vetmed.tamu.edu/stevenson-center/enrollment/endowment (last visited Mar. 7,
2011). The endowment can also ―be fully paid-up at the time of enrollment with a considerable
discount.‖ Id. In that case, there is no enrollment fee and the endowment ranges from $10,000 to
$100,000. Id.
269. Stevenson Companion Animal Life-Care Center: Pet Care, TEX. A&M UNIV.,
http://vetmed.tamu.edu/stevenson-center/pet-care (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
270. Id.; see also Stevens, supra note 267, at 11.
271. Gerry W. Beyer & Jonathan P. Wilkerson, Max‟s Taxes: A Tax-Based Analysis of Pet
Trusts, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1219, 1222 (2009).
272. This is particularly true of trusts. See ROGAK, supra note 265, at 60 (referring to the
―complexity‖ of revocable and testamentary trusts).
273. See, e.g., HOYT, supra note 253, at 172 (cautioning pet owners to avoid do-it-yourself
plans and recommending the use of an estate planning professional).
274. See, e.g., ROGAK, supra note 265, at 38–40 (advising selection of ―pet-savvy estateplanning experts‖).
275. HOYT, supra note 253, at 168.
276. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 263 (stating that decedents may ―fail to write
wills due to [the] . . . inability to confront their own mortality‖); Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in
Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1049 (2004)
(discussing ―[e]state planners‘ . . . uphill struggle to get clients actually to present themselves in a
law office—where, of course, they would directly confront their mortality‖); Stevens, supra note
267, at 11 (―Preparing a will that includes arrangements for your cat is vital, but many owners resist
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of older Americans, 20% of the respondents stated that ―‗[t]hinking about
my own death . . . scares me.‘‖277 Perhaps not surprisingly, only half of
American decedents die with a will.278
In addition, will provisions for pets―no matter how well
drafted―have a potentially fatal flaw for a decedent‘s nonhuman loved
ones. The decedent‘s directives do not become legally effective until the
will has been formally probated.279 The probate process may take weeks,
months, or even years to complete.280 The delay may ―mean the difference
between life and death‖281 for the pets the decedent hoped to protect.
A 1957 California case provides a cautionary tale.282 In 1944, silentfilm cowboy star William S. Hart executed a will, which intentionally
omitted his son283 and left his villa and 220-acre Horseshoe Ranch to Los
Angeles County for a public park.284 Hart‘s will further provided: ―All the
domestic animals which I may own at the time of my death shall be
allowed to spend their remaining days in the Park and shall be properly fed
and cared for at all times by the County.‖285 In 1946, Hart died and his son
contested the will.286 After over a decade of litigation,287 the estate finally
taking this important step [because] ‗[p]eople don‘t want to think about what will happen if they
die . . . .‘‖ (quoting Christine Belezza, a consultant with the Feline Health Center at Cornell
University‘s College of Veterinary Medicine)).
277. WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, supra note 87, at 71 (quoting 2006 AARP Thoughts on the
Afterlife Survey).
278. Id. (stating that ―roughly half the population dies intestate‖).
279. COLGATE, supra note 256, at 32 (―The instructions you put in your Will are not carried
out automatically. When you are gone there is a lengthy and formal process that must be followed in
each state to probate a Will.‖); Robert E. Blizard et al., Helping Clients Provide for Pets in Their
Estate Plans, PROB. & PROP., Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 52, 54 (noting that because of delays in probate
and ―final settlement of property . . . . it may take a long time for instructions regarding the pets‘
long-term care to be carried out‖).
280. Bambi Glenn, Estate Planning for Your Pets, MD. B.J., Sept.–Oct. 2007, at 23, 25
(discussing delays in the probate process).
281. ROGAK, supra note 265, at 46; see also SELTZER & BEYER, supra note 74, at 21–22
(discussing the potential ―bad outcome‖ for pets). This is the principal reason commentators
recommend use of a revocable inter vivos trust for care of a pet. See, e.g., CONGALTON &
ALEXANDER, supra note 72, at 82 (―The primary advantage of a [revocable] trust is that it
circumvents the delay between your death and the probating of your will. . . . [and] your caretaker
has immediate access to any funds required for the safety and well-being of your animals.‖). Wills
have other disadvantages. For example, ―[w]ills . . . are public record, available to beneficiaries,
heirs, thieves, reporters, and ‗inquiring minds‘ alike.‖ Foster, supra note 18, at 557. Decedents may
wish to keep provisions for care of pets, especially if the provisions are substantial, private so that
family members do not contest the will on mental capacity grounds. For a discussion of the
―public/private distinction‖ between wills and revocable trusts, see id. at 559–66.
282. In re Estate of Hart, 311 P.2d 605 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
283. Last Will and Testament of William S. Hart art. SECOND (Sept. 9, 1944) [hereinafter
Hart Will] (on file with the author).
284. Id. at art. FOURTH; see also Myrna Oliver, Obituaries; William S. Hart Jr., 81; Only Son
of Famed Silent Film Cowboy, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 2004, at B10 (describing Hart‘s will).
285. Hart Will, supra note 283, at art. FOURTH.L.
286. Estate of Hart, 311 P.2d at 607.
287. Id. at 614 (―After nearly ten years of litigation . . . the final accounting and petition for
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was closed and Hart‘s animals were free to spend their remaining years as
Hart had directed. Unfortunately, by that time, few if any animals were still
alive. According to the District Court of Appeal‘s 1957 opinion, as of
―January 10, 1955, there were then surviving two dogs, one burro, one
mare, and six horses. How many of these animals have since passed away
we are not advised.‖288
Contractual arrangements, too, have put decedents‘ pets at risk. After a
decedent‘s death, even the most well-intentioned lifetime care provider
may experience financial difficulties and be unable to give pets the level of
care the decedent expected.289 Some organizations go out of business
altogether and leave pets homeless.290
At worst, a facility may become a house of horrors. For example, in
2005, a Texas couple agreed to close their pet retirement center to avoid
prosecution for animal cruelty and fraud.291 When sheriff‘s deputies and
staff from the Texas Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
raided the center, they found over 200 cats living in ―cramped conditions
amid feces and flies.‖292 Some facilities that promise ―perpetual‖ animal
care condemn pets to an even more horrific fate. As Florida attorney Peggy
Hoyt reports, such ―facilities have been targeted by medical research
organizations involved in various cruelty industries as an easy, low-cost
source of research animals.‖293 Thus, if the decedent makes the wrong
choice of contractual partner, beloved pets could end up subjects of a
research project.294
distribution was filed on January 10, 1955 . . . .‖). Hart‘s son appealed this judgment as well and the
case did not end until 1957 when the district court of appeal affirmed the superior court‘s judgment
settling Hart‘s estate, id., and the Supreme Court denied the son‘s petition for a hearing.
288. Id.
289. See CONGALTON & ALEXANDER, supra note 72, at 121 (reporting that ―Nancy Peterson of
The Humane Society of the United States . . . is wary of what she calls ‗Mom and Pop places,‘
retirement centers operating purely on the goodness of the human heart, but not always blessed with
the financial know-how to survive‖); Zeke MacCormack, Animal Neglect Case; 200 Cats Seized
Near Comfort, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 28, 2005, at 1B (reporting that the owner of a pet
retirement home ―confirmed that financial hardships had delayed needed repairs‖).
290. Casteel, supra note 251, at 9 (―The client should beware of for-profit retirement homes
because they could go out of business if not sufficiently profitable.‖). Financial issues are not the
only potential problem. See Andrew Tran, Providing for Pooch, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 9, 2008, at
D1 (―[Pet retirement home operators] have a good heart and want to do good things, but what‘s
going to happen to the animals if these people get hurt or ill?‖).
291. Zeke MacCormack, Comfort Couple Agree to Give Up 202 of Their Cats, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 6, 2005, at 1B (―A Comfort area couple agreed Friday to close their pet
retirement home and forfeit 202 seized cats to avoid possible prosecution on animal cruelty
charges.‖); see also MacCormack, supra note 289 (―‗We do definitely have animal cruelty, and
possibly have fraud‘ . . . .‖ (quoting a sheriff‘s department investigator)). Officials emphasized that
―[c]onditions at the facility didn‘t live up to those portrayed on its Web site.‖ Id.
292. MacCormack, supra note 291.
293. HOYT, supra note 253, at 130.
294. Id. (―I can think of few things sadder than a family pet becoming part of any kind of
research project.‖).
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2. Legislative Reforms
In forty-five states and the District of Columbia,295 legislators have
enacted so-called ―pet trust‖296 laws to respond to their constituents‘ desire
to provide for nonhuman loved ones.297 Like estate planners, legislative
reformers have focused on legal mechanisms decedents can use to protect
pets and avoid family paradigm-based rules of inheritance. They too have
identified and addressed long-standing obstacles to judicial enforcement of
pet care arrangements. These reformers‘ approach is different, however.
Rather than working within or bypassing traditional restrictions, they have
attacked those restrictions. Specifically, legislators across the country have
liberalized the requirements for the most popular pet care
mechanism―trusts. In the process, they have addressed the three greatest
threats to decedents‘ efforts to provide for nonhuman survivors: (1) the
rule against perpetuities; (2) the prohibition against animals as
beneficiaries; and (3) drafting errors.
a. Rule Against Perpetuities
Nearly all pet trust laws have reduced or eliminated rule against
perpetuities restrictions. Some statutes continue to ―pay[] homage‖298 to
the rule but relax the requirements to encompass pet trusts. For example,
Oklahoma‘s new legislation rescues trusts for the benefit of animals by
allowing a human caretaker or remainder beneficiary to serve as a
measuring life for rule against perpetuities purposes.299 Similarly, New
Jersey law has dispensed with the measuring life requirement but still
limits the duration of pet trusts to twenty-one years.300 Thus, in New
Jersey, pet trusts are no longer automatically invalid but instead ―terminate
when no living animal is covered by the trust, or at the end of 21 years,
whichever occurs earlier.‖301
Most pet trust laws have gone still further and exempted pet trusts from
the rule against perpetuities. For instance, Maryland‘s 2009 law expressly
295. For a list of pet trust laws, see SELTZER & BEYER, supra note 74, at 144–80. Since
attorney Barry Seltzer and Professor Gerry Beyer compiled their list, three more states have enacted
pet trust laws―Georgia, Massachusetts, and Oklahoma. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-28 (West 2010);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 203, § 3C (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 199 (West 2010).
296. These statutes may encompass animals other than pets. For example, Oregon‘s statutory
provision is entitled ―pet trust.‖ OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130.185 (West 2010). However, the official
comment to this provision defines ―the so-called ‗pet trust‘‖ as a ―trust for the care of an animal,
including exotic, domestic, and pet animals.‖ The Oregon Uniform Trust Code and Comments, 42
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 187, 257 (2006) (reproducing the comment).
297. For example, the ―inspiration‖ behind Connecticut‘s 2009 statute was Eleanor Linkkila, a
retired University of Connecticut administrative assistant who contacted her state representative
after she discovered she could not create an enforceable trust for her two cats. MariAn Gail Brown,
Where There‟s a Will, There May Be a Pet Trust, CONN. POST ONLINE, Jan. 31, 2009.
298. Beyer, supra note 78, at 652.
299. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 199(G) (West 2010).
300. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:11-38(a) (West 2011).
301. Id.
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states that ―the common-law rule against perpetuities . . . does not apply to
. . . [a] trust created . . . to provide for the care of an animal alive during the
lifetime of the settlor.‖302 On May 5, 2010, one of the last holdouts―New
York―joined this reform movement. The legislature amended the law to
―eliminat[e] the 21-year limit for the duration of pet trusts.‖303 Today, New
Yorkers can ensure lifelong care for even their longest-lived horses,
parrots, or tortoises.304
b. Animals as Beneficiaries
Pet trust laws have abolished another rule courts have used to
invalidate pet care arrangements―the rule that animals cannot be
beneficiaries of trusts. In the forty-six jurisdictions that have enacted such
laws, individuals can establish trusts for nonhuman as well as human loved
ones. Indeed, the Delaware statute specifically provides that a trust for the
care of animals ―shall not be invalid because it lacks an identifiable person
as beneficiary.‖305
Legislative reformers have also addressed a related problem for trusts
that have animals as beneficiaries―the lack of a ―legal person‖ to enforce
the trust. For example, in Arizona, like other states that have adopted the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) model,306 a pet trust can be enforced by a
person either designated in the trust instrument or, if none, appointed by
the court.307 Other states have followed the lead of the Uniform Trust Code
drafters308 and enlarged the category of potential enforcers to include ―[a]
person having an interest in the welfare of the animal . . . .‖309 California
has the most expansive scheme of all, even allowing a ―nonprofit
charitable corporation that has as its principal activity the care of
animals . . . [to] inspect the animal, the premises where the animal is
maintained, or the books and records of the trust.‖310
c. Drafting Errors
Finally, some legislative reformers have tackled the problem that has
particularly plagued laypersons‘ pet care arrangements―drafting errors.
Indeed, a Detroit attorney has asserted that one of the principal goals of his
302. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102(b), (b)(12) (West 2010).
303. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7–8.1(a) (McKinney 2004), amended by 2010 N.Y.
Sess. Laws ch. 70 (McKinney).
304. For a list of average lifespan of animals, see SELTZER & BEYER, supra note 74, at 133–36.
The average lifespan of horses is forty years and of parrots is up to eighty years. Id. at 134–35.
―[T]ortoises have been known to live for over 150 years.‖ WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, supra note
87, at 587.
305. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3555(b) (West 2010).
306. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(4) (amended 1993).
307. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2907(C)(4) (2010).
308. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408(b) (amended 2005).
309. Id. For an example of a statute adopting this language, see ALA. CODE § 19-3B-408
(2010).
310. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15212(f) (West 2009).
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state‘s legislation ―is to bring poorly-drafted bequests under the pet trust
statute.‖311
UPC drafters―and those like the Michigan legislators312 who followed
their example―have introduced three important reforms to extend
protection to even the most inartfully drafted pet care arrangements. First,
they have called for liberal rules of construction.313 This includes reversing
the traditional judicial presumption that such dispositions are ―merely
precatory or honorary.‖314 Second, they have made the pet owner‘s intent
rather than the written expression of that intent determinative.315 In fact,
the UPC statutes provide that ―[e]xtrinsic evidence is admissible in
determining the transferor‘s intent.‖316 Third, and most remarkably, these
reformers extend protection of the ―pet trust‖317 statute not only to trusts
but also to other dispositive instruments providing care for animals.318 The
end result is a scheme that ―increase[s] the likelihood that the pet owner‘s
intent will be effectuated‖319 and that her nonhuman survivors will receive
the care she expected.
d. Limitations
Proponents claim pet trust laws give people ―peace of mind knowing
their animals will be properly cared for if owners die before their pets.‖320
However, these promising legislative reforms offer uncertain protection for
decedents‘ pets. In some states, individuals cannot even die with
confidence that their nonhuman loved ones will actually qualify as trust
beneficiaries. Consider, for instance, the Illinois statute‘s321 ambiguous
language. Illinois law permits ―[a] trust for the care of one or more
311. Eric Thomas Carver, Pet Trusts: Estate and Tax Planning Considerations Under
Michigan Law, 33 MICH. TAX LAW. 32, 32 (2007).
312. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2722(2) (West 2010) (adopting Uniform Probate Code
language).
313. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(b) (amended 1993) (―A governing instrument must be
liberally construed to bring the transfer within this subsection . . . .‖).
314. Id. (stating that the instrument must be construed ―to presume against the merely
precatory or honorary nature of the disposition‖).
315. Id. (stating that the instrument must be construed ―to carry out the general intent of the
transferor‖).
316. Id.
317. Id. (titling the subsection ―Trust for Pets‖).
318. The subsection refers to ―[a] governing instrument.‖ Id. ―Governing instrument‖ is
defined earlier in the Uniform Probate Code to include not only a trust but a broad array of
―dispositive, appointive, or nominative instrument[s] of any similar type.‖ Id. § 1–201(18).
319. Beyer, supra note 78, at 653.
320. Press Release, Office of Gov. M. Jodi Rell, Governor Rell: October 1 Law Allows Pet
Owners to Set Up Trusts for Animals (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.ct.gov/governorrell/cwp/view.
asp?A=3675&Q=448000&pp+12&n=1 (reporting Connecticut Governor M. Jodi Rell‘s
announcement after she signed Connecticut‘s first pet trust law); see also Emily Gardner, An Ode to
Roxy Russell: A Look at Hawaii‟s New Pet Trust Law, HAW. B. J., Apr. 2007, at 30, 33 (stating that
because of the new Hawaii pet trust law ―[p]eople can now have the peace of mind that comes from
knowing that their beloved family member(s) will be properly cared for after their death‖).
321. 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/15.2 (West 2010).
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designated domestic or pet animals.‖322 Suppose an Illinois resident creates
a trust for ―all the pet animals that I own at my death.‖323 Would that meet
the requirement of ―designated‖ animals? What about a trust for ―my cat
Beijing and any offspring born to her while the trust is enforceable‖? 324
Does the term ―designated‖ cover Beijing‘s kittens? Similarly, which
Illinois animals constitute ―domestic or pet animals‖? Does an alligator or
a Savannah (a wild/domestic hybrid cat)325 qualify? As a New Jersey
lawyer observed, ―Some people domesticate the darnd-est things.‖326 Not
surprisingly, most jurisdictions have rejected the ―domestic or pet‖
limitation. Thus, unlike their Illinois counterparts, Delaware residents can
establish a trust for ―any nonhuman member of the animal kingdom
but . . . [not] plants and inanimate objects.‖327
Moreover, nearly every pet trust statute denies decedents the ultimate
control over their pets‘ standard of living. These laws give courts or, in
North Carolina,328 court clerks the discretion to decide whether the
amounts decedents allocated for the care of their nonhuman loved ones are
―excessive.‖329 As a result, after a decedent‘s death, outsiders can reduce
trust funds to fit their own notions of ―reasonable‖ expenditures on pets.330
In addition, individuals cannot rely on a pet trust statute to be a ―foolproof mechanism for guaranteeing a bequest to an animal is valid.‖331
322. Id. This language is nearly identical to that used in the Uniform Probate Code. UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2–907(b) (amended 1993) (―[A] trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet
animal is valid.‖).
323. I borrow this example from Adam J. Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes: Policy, Ambiguity, and
Anomaly in the Uniform Laws, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 941 n.127 (1999).
324. This example is a variation of a possible problematic provision suggested by Professor
William Reppy. Reppy, supra note 118, at 237 (―If the trust is for ten named horses ‗and the
offspring born to any of the above mares while the trust is enforceable,‘ have the offspring been
‗designated‘ as the [UPC] statute requires?‖). The inspiration for this example is my parents‘ now
deceased cat, Beijing, the world‘s fattest, nastiest cat, who fortunately never had any offspring.
325. The animals are in fact illegal in some states. See Bradford L. Miner, Stick to the Known
When Giving Pets; Exotic Species Make Poor Presents, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester, Mass.),
Dec. 9, 2005, at B1 (reporting that alligators and early generations of Savannah cats are illegal in
Massachusetts). For extended discussion of ―[e]xotic pets prohibited vs. acceptable animals as
pets,‖ see SELTZER & BEYER, supra note 74, at 96–107, 201–04.
326. Kris W. Scibiorski, When Your Client‟s a Dog . . . , N.J. LAW., Nov. 5, 2007, at 1
(quoting Elenora L. Benz).
327. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3555(g) (West 2010).
328. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-4-408(g) (West 2010).
329. The Uniform Probate Code model allows a court to ―reduce the amount of the property
transferred, if it determines that that amount substantially exceeds the amount required‖ for care of
the animal. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2–907(c)(6) (amended 1993). Michigan has adopted this
approach. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2722(3)(f) (West 2010) (using this language). States
adopting the Uniform Trust Code model remove the word ―substantially.‖ See, e.g., KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 58a-408(c) (2010) (allowing ―the court [to] determine[] that the value of the trust property
exceeds the amount required for the intended use‖).
330. In fact, this is what the New York Surrogate did to Trouble‘s trust. See Toobin, supra
note 3 (reporting that the surrogate reduced Trouble‘s trust from $12 million to $2 million).
331. Taylor, supra note 210, at 436.
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332

Although some jurisdictions favor liberal construction of documents,
most do not. If the document is not properly drafted, the trust will likely
fail. Pet trust laws effectively ―penalize[ ] those who cannot afford or
choose not to hire an attorney.‖333 Some jurisdictions only compound the
problem by establishing further formalities, procedures, administrative
hurdles, and expenses that the average pet owner could not anticipate.334
For example, even the most pet friendly335 statute, Colorado‘s law, requires
registration of pet trusts and subjects trustees to all of Colorado‘s laws
regarding trusts and trustees, including filing, accounting, investment, and
other administrative and fiduciary duties.336
By far the most serious flaw of the legislative reform approach is lack
of uniformity. Because of the mobility of modern society, this lack of
uniformity can defeat ―even the most well-intentioned‖ pet owners‘ efforts
to provide for their nonhuman loved ones.337 For example, if a Connecticut
resident wanted to create a trust for the lifelong care of his companion of
twenty years, a parrot named Lucy, he could do so.338 If Lucy lived forty
years after the decedent‘s death, she would continue to be covered by the
trust. A New Jersey resident, in contrast, could not achieve the same
objective. He could guarantee Lucy only twenty-one years of care.339 If the
Connecticut resident subsequently moved to Minnesota, a state without a

332. See supra Part III.B.2.c.
333. Taylor, supra note 210, at 436.
334. Some statutes specifically exempt pet trusts, especially small trusts, from these
requirements. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2907(C)(5) (West 2011) (―Except as ordered
by the court or required by the trust instrument, no filing, report, registration, periodic accounting,
separate maintenance of funds, appointment or fee is required by reason of the existence of the
fiduciary relationship of the trustee.‖); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 199(E) (West 2010) (generally
exempting trusts that do not exceed $20,000 from such requirements).
335. Taylor, supra note 210, at 436 (describing Colorado‘s pet trust law as ―the most ‗pro se
friendly‘‖).
336. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-901(3)(e) (West 2010) (―All trusts created under this
section shall be registered and all trustees shall be subject to the laws of this state applying to trusts
and trustees.‖).
337. Rebecca J. Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning Issues Relating to
Companion Animals, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 236 (2003) (―Given the mobility of society, even the
most well-intentioned testators may be unable to protect their pets if they move to states without
[pet trust provisions] . . . . [U]ntil there is more uniformity in state law, people will need to be
careful if they want to ensure that their pets will be able to live in comfort for the remainder of their
days.‖). Because of this lack of uniformity, practitioners recommend clients ―[c]onsider the
likelihood of an out-of-state move‖ and take precautions, such as ―a choice of law provision in the
trust document.‖ Abert, supra note 257, at 22.
338. Connecticut law allows a trust to continue until ―the death of the last surviving animal.‖
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-489a(a) (West 2010). The inspiration for this example is a New
Jersey parrot named Lucy. The lawyer who drafted a trust for her care reported, ‗―Between you and
me, she‘s a nasty bird that bites me every chance she gets, but they [the clients] love her.‘‖ Miller,
supra note 245 (quoting Gary B. Garland).
339. See supra notes 300–01 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey‘s twenty-one year
limitation).
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pet trust law, Lucy‘s future could be even more precarious.340 The funds
the decedent thought would assure his beloved companion a long and
comfortable life could well pass instead to those the family paradigm
deemed his natural objects―his ―closest‖ human family members.341
C. Proposals to Redefine the Legal Status of Pets
Finally, reformers have offered another more controversial
strategy―redefining the legal status of pets, or, as most proponents prefer,
―companion animals.‖342 In a vast literature that extends well beyond the
inheritance context,343 they have attacked the traditional legal view that
pets are mere property.344 Reformers argue that this view is outdated,345
even ―perverse.‖346 It ignores the special bond between humans and their
companion animals347 and the reality that animals are ―sentient beings‖
with feelings and emotions.348 In response, reformers have offered three
340. If the decedent named Lucy the beneficiary, the trust would be invalid. The trust could
have been valid if the decedent had named Lucy‘s caregiver as the beneficiary. See Jonathan P.
Wilkerson, Comment, A “Purr”fect Amendment: Why Congress Should Amend the Internal
Revenue Code to Apply the Charitable Remainder Exception to Pet Trusts, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
587, 591 & n.38, 592 (2009) (noting that ―traditional trusts,‖ trusts ―in which the beneficiary is a
person, not a pet,‖ can be used in every state, even those states without pet trust laws).
341. This would occur, for example, if the decedent died intestate or funded the pet trust with
the residue of his estate and provided no alternate residuary beneficiary.
342. See supra note 14 (discussing the use of ―companion animal‖).
343. A review of this extensive literature is beyond the scope of this Article. For just a
sampling of relevant works, see generally GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW
(1995); STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000);
ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C.
Nussbaum eds., 2004).
344. See supra Part II.B.1, 2 (discussing the legal view of pets as property).
345. See, e.g., William C. Root, Note, “Man‟s Best Friend”: Property or Family Member? An
Examination of the Legal Classification of Companion Animals and Its Impact on Damages
Recoverable for Their Wrongful Death or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REV. 423, 446 (2002) (―[T]he law‘s
characterization of companion animals as property is archaic . . . .‖); Kelly Wilson, Note, Catching
the Unique Rabbit: Why Pets Should Be Reclassified as Inimitable Property Under the Law, 57
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 167, 195 (2009) (referring to the ―severely outdated concepts of pets as personal
property‖).
346. Steven M. Wise, Recovery of Common Law Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of
Society, and Loss of Companionship for the Wrongful Death of a Companion Animal, 4 ANIMAL L.
33, 72 (1998).
347. See, e.g., Huss, supra note 337, at 181–85, 192–93, 203 (―[T]he law does not reflect the
current status of the human-animal bond.‖); Debra Squires-Lee, Note, In Defense of Floyd:
Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1061–68 (1995)
(discussing the ―bond between human and companion animal‖). See generally ALAN BECK &
AARON KATCHER, BETWEEN PETS AND PEOPLE: THE IMPORTANCE OF ANIMAL COMPANIONSHIP (1996);
COMPANION ANIMALS AND US: EXPLORING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PEOPLE AND PETS (Anthony L.
Podberscek et al. eds., 2000).
348. See, e.g., CAROLYN B. MATLACK, WE‘VE GOT FEELINGS TOO!: PRESENTING THE SENTIENT
PROPERTY SOLUTION xiv (2006) (―Animals are legally our property but unlike the rest of our
possessions they have feelings! We know they feel pain, distress, love and joy. They are ‗sentient‘
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349

main approaches to change the legal status of pets.
The first approach envisions a separate, higher property status for
pets.350 For example, author and attorney Carolyn Matlack has proposed a
new category――sentient property‖351―to recognize that ―animals are
different from other property like a chair or a piece of luggage. . . . [T]hey
have feelings.‖352 Rather than challenging the existing classification of pets
as property, these reformers offer a compromise. They ―tweak‖353 the
framework to effect an ―‗incremental increase‘‖354 in the legal status of
pets. As Professor Susan Hankin explained, this scheme ―retains the
property status of companion animals but accords them a place above
inanimate property.‖355
In contrast, the second approach rejects the very concept of pets as
property. The reformers in favor of this view argue that the property
concept is fundamentally inconsistent with the modern societal view of
pets as family members.356 Accordingly, their solution is to ―abrogate‖ the
property status of pets and, instead, grant those animals full legal
recognition as family members.357
which is another word for ‗feeling‘.[sic]‖); Wilson, supra note 345, at 183–86 (stating that ―[a] pet
is a sentient being, capable of feeling pain, fear, aggression, loyalty, and arguably even love‖ and
discussing the ―unique biological and social traits that pets possess‖).
349. This is not meant to suggest that redefining the status of animals, including pets, is the
only approach proposed. For example, Professor Cass Sunstein has asserted, ―A state could
dramatically increase enforcement of existing bans on cruelty and neglect without turning animals
into persons, or making them into something other than property.‖ Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to
ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 343, at 3, 11.
350. See, e.g., MATLACK, supra note 348 (―sentient property‖); Susan J. Hankin, Not a Living
Room Sofa: Changing the Legal Status of Companion Animals, 4 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 314,
379–80, 384–88 (2007) (―companion animal property‖); Wilson, supra note 345, at 192–96
(―inimitable property‖). A few judges too have expressed a similar view. See, e.g., Bueckner v.
Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 377 (Tex. App. 1994) (Andell, J., concurring) (―Because of the
characteristics of animals in general and of domestic pets in particular, I consider them to belong to
a unique category of ‗property‘ . . . .‖).
351. She defines sentient property as ―‗any warm-blooded, domesticated, non-human animal
dependent on one or more human persons for food, shelter, veterinary care, or companionship
normally kept in or near the household of its owner, guardian or keeper.‘‖ MATLACK, supra note
348, at 72.
352. Id. at 26.
353. Id.
354. Hankin, supra note 350, at 386 n.316 (quoting April 13, 2004, letter from Carolyn
Matlack to the Texas Third Circuit Court of Appeals).
355. Id. at 320; see also Wilson, supra note 345, at 192, 195 (stating that her scheme, which
―will entitle pets to a higher status than ordinary personal property,‖ is necessary ―to achieve the
dual goals of preserving existing framework in the law, while updating severely outdated concepts
of pets as personal property‖).
356. Paek, supra note 68, at 484 (arguing that because ―established legal doctrine classifies
companion animals as property . . . . , the law fails to reflect society‘s recognition of companion
animals as family members‖); Root, supra note 345, at 449 (―The law‘s categorization of a
companion animal as merely property . . . does not accurately reflect societal views [that] . . . pets
are thought of more as family members than as inanimate objects.‖).
357. Paek, supra note 68, at 484, 524 (stating that the ―property classification of all animals
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The third approach offers an even more radical response―extending
legal personhood358 to animals. As Professor Steven Wise proclaimed,
―Without legal personhood, one is invisible to civil law. One has no civil
rights. One might as well be dead.‖359 Some reformers call for a complete
jettisoning360 of the animals as property paradigm. Professor Gary
Francione expressed this view best: animals should have ―the right not to
be property.‖361 These reformers reject anything short of personhood,
including proposals like those above362 that would make animals ―quasipersons‖ or ―things plus.‖363
Other advocates of this third approach support more limited legal
personhood. For example, Wise opposes the classification of animals as
―legal things‖ rather than ―legal persons‖364 but at least initially ―demands
personhood‖ for only two groups of animals, chimpanzees and bonobos.365
He acknowledges that certain animals, such as beetles and ants, ―should
never have these rights.‖366
Other reformers, most notably Professor David Favre, argue that
proposals to abolish the property status of animals are impossible and

should be completely abrogated‖ so that ―companion animals can finally gain legal recognition as
family members‖).
358. For an outstanding extended discussion of the different definitions of ―personhood‖ in the
animal rights context, see Taimie L. Bryant, Sacrificing the Sacrifice of Animals: Legal Personhood
for Animals, the Status of Animals as Property, and the Presumed Primacy of Humans, 39 RUTGERS
L.J. 247 (2008).
359. WISE, supra note 343, at 4.
360. Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531,
532 (1998) (―[T]he concept of animals as property can and should be jettisoned.‖); see also Lee
Hall & Anthony Jon Waters, From Property to Person: The Case of Evelyn Hart, 11 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 1, 3 (2000) (―Because the property classification treats non-human apes as instruments,
tools, and toys, their interests can be protected only by reclassifying them as persons.‖). Proponents
of this view do not demand immediate abolition of the property paradigm. See, e.g., Gary L.
Francione, Reflections on Animals, Property, and the Law and Rain Without Thunder, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 56–57 (2007) (―We can pursue the incremental eradication of the property
status―and we can do so now . . . .‖).
361. Gary L. Francione, Animals―Property or Persons?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT
DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 343, at 108, 131; see also GARY L. FRANCIONE,
INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG?, at xxxiv (2000) (―I argue that animals
have only one right―a right not to be treated as property or resources.‖).
362. See supra notes 350–55 and accompanying text.
363. Francione, supra note 361, at 131.
364. WISE, supra note 343, at 4, 267, 270. Wise has written extensively about the historical
origins of ―legal thinghood‖ for nonhuman animals. See, e.g., Steven M. Wise, The Legal
Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 471 (1996).
365. WISE, supra note 343, at 4. He emphasizes, however, that this is only the beginning. Id. at
268 (―I also never meant to imply that chimpanzees and bonobos are the only nonhuman animals
who might be entitled to the fundamental legal rights to bodily integrity and bodily
liberty. . . . Through careful analyses similar to those I have done for chimpanzees and bonobos, we
can determine the next best candidates [for extension of those rights] . . . .‖).
366. Id. at 5.
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367

unnecessary. Favre‘s solution is to bridge the categories of property and
legal persons.368 He presents ―a new paradigm that gives animals the status
of juristic persons without entirely severing the concept of property
ownership.‖369 Favre offers as one example of his new paradigm in action
the relationship of a cat (Zoe) and her human owners (the Willards).370 The
Willards would retain legal title to Zoe, but Zoe would now have what
Favre calls ―equitable self-ownership.‖371 Because of this split ownership,
the Willards as legal titleholders would have to ―recognize and take into
account the interests of the equitable titleholder,‖372 Zoe. Indeed, if the
Willards mistreated Zoe, she would have the legal right to sue (through a
human representative) for monetary and perhaps even equitable
damages.373
Unfortunately, redefining the legal status of pets―be it as an
―enhanced type of property,‖374 family members, or legal persons―also
fails to address the flaws of the inheritance system. The updated property
definition would differentiate pets from decedents‘ inanimate property and
would recognize the special bond between decedents and their nonhuman
loved ones. However, this proposal would actually represent a step
backwards in the inheritance context. As the previous section has shown,
recent reforms—especially pet trust legislation—have already moved away
from the classification of pets as mere property and now permit pets to be
trust beneficiaries. Indeed, animal law scholars have cited this development
as a ―conceptual breakthrough‖ that grants animals ―legal personhood for
purposes of trust enforcement.‖375
367. David Favre, Integrating Animal Interests into Our Legal System, 10 ANIMAL L. 87, 90–
91 (2004) [hereinafter Favre, Integrating Animal Interests] (―To seek such abolition [of property
status] is unwise and unnecessary.‖); David Favre, A New Property Status for Animals: Equitable
Self-Ownership, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 343, at
234, 236 [hereinafter Favre, A New Property Status] (―[R]adical change in the short term is
impossible in our legal system. It would be more realistic to be incremental, to begin the journey of
change by modifying, but not eliminating, the existing property status of animals.‖).
368. Favre, A New Property Status, supra note 367, at 245 (stating that ―[p]resently, the law
has only two clearly separated categories: property or juristic persons‖ and that his proposed ―new
paradigm . . . is a blending of the two previously separated categories‖). Favre‘s proposal also
bridges the ―family‖ category. Id. at 238–39 (arguing that his approach ―shift[s] the nature of the
relationship between the owner and the animal from that which is like the ownership of the rock to
that which is more like, but not identical to, the custodial relationship of the human parent and the
human child‖).
369. Id. at 245.
370. Id. at 238, 243.
371. For extended discussion of this concept, see David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for
Animals, 50 DUKE L.J. 473 (2000).
372. Favre, A New Property Status, supra note 367, at 241.
373. Id. at 243; see also David S. Favre, Judicial Recognition of the Interests of Animals―A
New Tort, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 333, 352–67 (proposing a ―new tort―the intentional interference
with the primary interests of an animal‖).
374. Hankin, supra note 350, at 381.
375. Favre, Integrating Animal Interests, supra note 367, at 94. But see Francione, supra note
360, at 50 (criticizing this view).
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The redefinition of pets as family members is also problematic. At first
glance, the emphasis on family appears to be a promising approach to bring
pets within protection of the family paradigm of inheritance law. As I have
argued elsewhere,376 however, a reform that defines eligibility in terms of
family membership raises fundamental questions. What constitutes a
―family-like‖ relationship between decedents and survivors? Would a
survivor qualify as one of inheritance law‘s preferred claimants, that is, a
―child‖ or other close relative?377 What if the decedent defined her survivor
as her ―best friend and companion‖378 rather than family member? In the
end, then, a family definition would offer at most a partial solution. It
would continue to exclude the survivors―nonhuman as well as
human―the decedent regarded as her nearest and dearest but not as
members of her family.379
Finally, the redefinition of pets as legal persons would also be an
ineffective response to the flaws of inheritance law. As legal persons, pets
would simply join the long line of human ―persons‖ the family paradigm
excludes―unmarried cohabitants, extended and blended family members,
and nonrelated caregivers, friends, and companions.380 Thus, there is only
one way to ensure that inheritance law no longer defeats decedents‘ wishes
and leaves their pets unprotected. Reformers must challenge the very
foundation of inheritance law―the family paradigm‘s narrow definition of
―natural objects of the decedent‘s bounty.‖
IV. BEYOND THE FAMILY PARADIGM: RECOGNIZING INHERITANCE BY
PETS AS ―NATURAL‖
The U.S. inheritance system is rooted in the past. It continues to
privilege membership in a family that is ―rapidly becoming an American
anachronism.‖381 Because of its outdated focus on the traditional nuclear
family, inheritance law has failed to recognize what is nothing short of a
paradigm shift.382 As this Part will show, Americans in record numbers are
376. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 228–35 (setting out and criticizing reforms to
redefine the family); Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1364–74 (same).
377. According to one commentator, ―[w]hile a pet may be able to become a part of the family,
it can never attain the same status as a child or human family member.‖ Wilson, supra note 345, at
186.
378. See supra note 82 (citing wills that referred to pets as friends and companions).
379. See Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1374 (making this argument with
respect to human survivors).
380. See supra Part II.A.
381. Shani M. King, U.S. Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of
Family: Toward a Functional Definition of Family that Protects Children‟s Fundamental Human
Rights, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 509, 523 (2010).
382. P. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE POWERFUL BOND BETWEEN PEOPLE AND PETS: OUR
BOUNDLESS CONNECTIONS TO COMPANION ANIMALS, at xxi (2008) (referring to a ―distinct paradigm
shift in the way [Americans] think and feel about‖ pets); PAMELA N. DANZIGER, WHY PEOPLE BUY
THINGS THEY DON‘T NEED 133 (2004) (stating that ―a paradigm shift [has] occurred in how
Americans relate to their cats, dogs, and other pets‖ and that pets now are ―valued as companions
and friends. They have become full-fledged members of the family‖).
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turning to pets for companionship and affection. Thus, it is time to explore
new approaches to inheritance that will encompass decedents‘ nonhuman
and human loved ones.
A. Pets and Today‟s American Family
According to recent surveys, nearly two-thirds of American households
have at least one pet.383 In contrast, only 35% of households have
children384 and less than one-quarter of households consist of the
traditional nuclear family unit (married couples with their own children
under eighteen years old)385 so prized by inheritance law‘s family
paradigm. In the past decade alone, the number of households with pets
increased by 12%.386 Attitudes toward pets have changed just as
dramatically. Pets have gone ―from worker to companion to family
member, or even soul mate.‖387 Indeed, many obituaries now include a list
of the decedent‘s surviving pets as well as human family members.388
Study after study has documented that Americans regard their pets as
their family members, friends, and companions.389 For example, a survey
of 896 military families revealed that 98% of the respondents accorded
their pets ―full family member[]‖ or ―friend[]‖ status.390 While dog and cat
owners most often describe their pets as family members and friends,391
383. See, e.g., Kelly Bothum, Sit, Stay, Now Work Your Magic, NEWS J., Oct. 20, 2009, at
NaN, available at 2009 WLNR 20820259 (reporting U.S. Census figures); John Woestendiek, A
Dog‟s Life, BALT. SUN, July 15, 2007, at 1N (reporting APPMA‘s National Pet Owner Survey
results); see also Press Release, Eureka, Eureka Introduces the Purr-fect Pet Vacuum (July 8, 2008),
www.prnewswire.com (―[A]ccording to a recent survey by the American Veterinary Medical
Association[, n]early 60 percent of American households reportedly have pets . . . .‖).
384. Press Release, Eureka, supra note 383; see also GRIER, supra note 14, at 315 (stating that
―36 percent included children‖).
385. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES &
MATERIALS 361 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing U.S. Census statistics).
386. Press Release, Am. Pet Prods. Ass‘n, supra note 13.
387. Woestendiek, supra note 383. For extended discussion of the historical relationship
between Americans and their pets, see GRIER, supra note 14.
388. See, e.g., Death Notice: Sarah Jane Graham, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 2009, at C27 (stating
that the decedent ―leaves 7 cats, 2 dogs, 2 roosters, 1 fish and 2 frogs‖); Richard, John H.,
HARTFORD COURANT, June 10, 2010, at B10 (stating that the decedent ―will also be greatly missed
by his favorite truck riding buddy Kaiser, his dog, and cats, Zeus and Samantha‖).
389. See Sheila Bonas et al., Pets in the Network of Family Relationships: An Empirical Study,
in COMPANION ANIMALS AND US, supra note 347, at 209, 212 (listing ―studies which report high
percentages of people describing pets as family‖); Squires-Lee, supra note 347, at 1065
(summarizing studies in which 80% of participants described pets as their family members or
closest friends).
390. STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 278
n.104 (2003) (citing a study by Thomas E. Catanzaro).
391. ROD PREECE & LORNA CHAMBERLAIN, ANIMAL WELFARE AND HUMAN VALUES 233 (1993)
(reporting that in a 1991 survey of ―41 million U.S. dog owners 13 million claimed their attachment
to their animals as close as that of a best friend, 6.2 million as close as a child and 4.2 as close as a
spouse‖); Betsy Kerr, Dogs as Family Members and the Level of Attachment in Specific
Populations, MCNAIR RES. J. 26, 27 (2008–09) (reporting numerous studies showing that ―virtually
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even reptile owners have expressed similar views. For instance, in its 2007
National Pet Owners Survey, the American Pet Products Manufacturers
Association reported that 17% of reptile owners viewed their pets ―like a
child/family member‖392 and 10% actually bought Christmas gifts for their
reptiles.393
In fact, numerous studies indicate that many Americans have a closer
attachment to their pets than their human family members. For example, in
a study published in the Journal of Mental Health Counseling, 122 dog
owners were asked to place symbols for themselves, their dogs, and human
family members within a circle representing their ―life space.‖394 Thirtyeight percent placed themselves closer to their dogs than any humans.395 In
a Gallup poll of 885 dog owners, a majority responded that they regard
their dogs as better companions than their relatives.396 Pet Owners Surveys
by the American Animal Hospital Association have revealed even more
startling results. One-third of pet owners stated that they spend more time
with their pets than with family or friends.397 In a survey of people who
took their pets to the hospital, nearly one-half of women responded that
they rely more on their pets for affection than on their husbands and
children.398 When asked ―If you were deserted on an island and could have
only one companion, which would you pick?‖ more pet owners chose a
dog or a cat rather than a human.399
Experts have identified a number of possible explanations for this
trend.400 These include economic prosperity,401 an aging population,402 and
all of the participants saw their dogs as members of the family‖); Ginger Strand, What‟s the Use of
Pets?, ORION, Sept.–Oct. 2007, http://www.orionmagazine.org (stating that in a 2007 survey by the
APPMA, 71% of dog owners and 64% of cat owners consider their pet a family member).
392. Strand, supra note 391 (reporting statistics).
393. Ylan Q. Mui, Ultimate Creature Comforts, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2007, at D1 (reporting
statistics).
394. Sandra B. Barker & Randolph T. Barker, The Human-Canine Bond: Closer than Family
Ties?, 10 J. MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 46, 48 (1988).
395. Id. at 52; see also BECK & KATCHER, supra note 347, at 44–45 (describing a similar
technique and finding that people ―almost always draw their pet closer to themselves than other
family members‖).
396. Kim North, Dogs Collar Equal or More Love than People, Poll Finds, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, May 5, 1998, at 5A.
397. Downloads: Pet Sound Bites, BRANDWEEK, Mar. 27, 2000, at 20, available at 2000
WLNR 9887624 (reporting statistics).
398. Gordon Gregory, The Power of Puppy Love, SUNDAY OREGONIAN, Apr. 6, 1997, at E01
(reporting statistics).
399. Summary of Results: American Animal Hospital Association 2004 Pet Owner Survey,
AM. ANIMAL HOSP. ASS‘N, http://www.aahanet.org/media/graphics/petownersurvey2004.pdf (last
visited Mar. 27, 2011) (reporting results from question No. 4 of the survey).
400. As historian Katherine Grier has emphasized, ―[n]o single social or cultural factor can
account for‖ the ―tremendous burst of attention and interest in‖ pet keeping. GRIER, supra note 14,
at 315; see also Morris B. Holbrook et al., A Collective Stereographic Photo Essay on Key Aspects
of Animal Companionship: The Truth About Dogs and Cats, ACAD. MARKETING SCI. REV., Jan. 1,
2001, http://www.amsreview.org/articles/holbrook01-2001.pdf (reporting the results of a study
identifying the reasons people turn to animal companions).
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403

even fashion.
As historian Katherine Grier has remarked, fashion
―creates fads‖ for certain types of dogs and can turn rare breeds and exotic
animals into ―ambulatory status symbols.‖404
Many authors cite larger societal changes, most notably the breakdown
of the family.405 They emphasize that in a world where ―[f]amily ties may
be tenuous, fragile, or nonexistent,‖406 Americans are turning to pets to fill
the void.407
Similarly, commentators have focused on ―the disintegration of
communities.‖408 They argue that with increased social mobility,
―[n]eighborhoods where families live for generations, sharing history,
culture, and social activities are rare.‖409 Technology may only have
exacerbated the problem. As author P. Elizabeth Anderson observed, ―[a]
quick phone call here or an e-mail there does not a relationship sustain.
Our social contacts are characterized by the Internet, iPods, Blackberries,
cell phones, or television.‖410 As a result, pets are now providing the
companionship, support, and ―buffer against loneliness‖411 once found with
friends and neighbors.
Finally, several scholars have pointed to the stresses of modern
American society and culture, such as constant change, chaos, fear,
materialism, and alienation.412 Professor Alan Beck and his co-author
401. GRIER, supra note 14, at 316–18; Huss, supra note 337, at 194 (citing the ―affluence and
materialistic values in U.S. society‖).
402. Experts argue that the aging of the baby boomer generation in particular may have an
impact on the increased interest in pets. See, e.g., Woestendiek, supra note 383 (quoting an
organization as stating ―‗[a]s more baby boomers become empty-nesters, they will seek to fill the
vacuum left by their departed children with the four-legged variety . . .‘‖).
403. GRIER, supra note 14, at 318–19.
404. Id. at 318.
405. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 398 (referring to the ―swelling divorce rates [and]
increasing numbers of single-parent families‖); Tamina Toray, The Human-Animal Bond and Loss:
Providing Support for Grieving Clients, 26 J. MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 244, 244 (2004)
(―Changes in the family structure and mobility in society have created an accompanying increase in
the importance of social roles that pets play in people‘s lives.‖).
406. DIANE POMERANCE, PET PARENTHOOD 4 (2007).
407. William Hathaway, People, Pets and Vets, HARTFORD COURANT, June 1, 1997, at A1;
Robin Stansbury, At Your Service, Pooch, HARTFORD COURANT, July 26, 1999, at A1. Sandra
Barker, director of the Center for Human-Animal Interaction, suggests that one reason people may
be closer to their pets than their human family members is that as ―‗families have become more
separated,‘ . . . . ‗[P]ets are providing that form of social support that years ago we‘d get from that
family member living close by.‘‖ Pet Door to HEAVEN, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 2007,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-04-19/news/0704190627_1_pet-owners-center-for-humananimal-interaction-memorials (quoting Sandra Barker).
408. Gregory, supra note 398.
409. ANDERSON, supra note 382, at xxii.
410. Id. at xxi; POMERANCE, supra note 406, at 6 (―[In an] increasingly technological, and
impersonal world in which so many of us feel isolated, disconnected, or detached from one another,
an animal companion provides us with love, affection, devotion and loyalty.‖).
411. Gregory, supra note 398 (referring to the findings of then-associate director of the Center
for Animals and Society Lee Zasloff‘s ―research with single women‖).
412. For discussion of these stresses, see BECK & KATCHER, supra note 347, at 26–29.
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Aaron Katcher put it best: ―[P]ets offer a bulwark of stability‖413 and
―protective armor against much of the pain of living.‖414 Pets may even
serve as an antidote to urbanization. As Lee Zasloff, associate director of
the University of California at Davis Center for Animals and Society,
noted, ―‗Pets [can] provide links to nature that are increasingly hard to
touch in this technological and urbanizing culture . . . .‘‖415
Although experts find different explanations persuasive, they all agree
on one point. The human-animal bond is ―powerful‖416 and only likely to
grow stronger in the future.417 Thus, it is time for inheritance law to
abandon the abstract family categories of the past and recognize that the
bond between Americans and their pets may well transcend death.
B. Implications for Inheritance Law
In earlier work, I advocated recognition that inheritance involves real
people rather than abstractions.418 I argued that reformers should look
beyond the rigid, status-based family paradigm for more flexible,
individualized schemes of inheritance.419 I found two approaches most
promising―what I called the decedent intent approach and the actual
relationship approach.420 I showed that both approaches are already reality
in a related context.421 For over a century, courts have applied the decedent
intent approach and the actual relationship approach in resolving disputes
over disposition of a decedent‘s remains.422
413. Id. at 27.
414. Id. at xiv.
415. Gregory, supra note 398 (quoting Lee Zasloff); see also Holbrook et al., supra note 400,
at 5 (reporting that some participants in their study stated that ―their pets provide them an
opportunity more fully to appreciate Nature in general or to experience ‗wildlife‘ in particular via a
daily contact with members of another species‖).
416. ANDERSON, supra note 382 (including in her book‘s title ―The Powerful Bond Between
Pets and People‖); Woestendiek, supra note 383 (referring to the ―powerful bond‖). Indeed, clinical
hypnotherapist Marjorie Padorr argues that ―the human-pet bond can form faster and ultimately be
stronger than the human-human bond . . . . ‗It‘s the strongest bond since time immemorial.‘‖ Leo
Smith, „90s Family, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1995, at E3 (quoting Marjorie Padorr).
417. Janice M. Pintar, Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and the Fair
Market Value Approach in Wisconsin: The Case for Extending Tort Protection to Companion
Animals and Their Owners, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 735, 766 (―[R]esearch has shown that the strength of
the human-animal bond is increasing.‖).
418. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 199, 200–01; Foster, Individualized Justice,
supra note 16, at 1399; see also Jane B. Baron, Essay, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42
DUKE L.J. 630, 664 (1992) (―Real people, not abstractions, write wills . . . .‖).
419. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 251–71; Foster, Individualized Justice, supra
note 16, at 1385–99.
420. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 257–71. In a recent article, Professor Lee-ford
Tritt has made a persuasive case for the decedent intent approach. According to Tritt, ―the default
rules that govern succession law should correspond and be in line regardless of whether the
decedent dies intestate or testate. The decedent‘s intent should control.‖ Tritt, supra note 46, at
278–79.
421. Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1385–99.
422. Id.
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The decedent intent approach would give real content to the cherished
American ideal of ―[d]onative freedom.‖423 Rather than implementing
traditional family-based definitions of ―natural objects of the decedent‘s
bounty,‖ this approach would extend inheritance rights to the survivors
decedents themselves defined as their natural objects―family and
nonfamily alike.424 The decedent intent approach ―would consider the full
range of decedents‘ expressions of their dispositive preferences, from
formally executed wills to oral statements of intent.‖425
The actual relationship approach would focus on an individual
decedent‘s lifetime relationships with survivors.426 It would consider such
relationships as those ―involving support, financial sharing, legal
obligations or decisionmaking authority for the other party, or a decedent‘s
attitude of generosity toward a person or organization that would likely
have continued had death not intervened.‖427
This Article confirms the wisdom of exploring new directions for
inheritance law. It demonstrates that in the real world the family paradigm
imposes significant costs on decedents and their survivors.428 The
remainder of this Article explores how two more flexible, individualized
schemes―the decedent intent approach and the actual relationship
approach429―might better meet the needs of today‘s American decedents
and their nonhuman loved ones.
1. The Decedent Intent Approach
The decedent intent approach would have a single objective: to identify
and effectuate an individual‘s plans for her nonhuman as well as human
survivors. Accordingly, this approach would give utmost respect to validly
executed written instruments430―be they wills or will substitutes―that
clearly express a decedent‘s wishes to provide for her pets. The result
would be a significant change in mental capacity doctrines and rules.431
Provisions for pets, even those at the expense of an individual‘s closest
human family members, would no longer create a presumption that the
423. Id. at 1388; see also Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 258.
424. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 257; Foster, Individualized Justice, supra
note 16, at 1387–88.
425. Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1388.
426. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 268; Foster, Individualized Justice, supra
note 16, at 1388.
427. Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1388 (internal quotation marks and
external citation omitted); see also Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 269–70.
428. See Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 240–51 (identifying the human costs of
the family paradigm).
429. Although these two approaches will be discussed separately, in fact a court can apply both
to determine the most appropriate disposition of a decedent‘s estate. See Foster, Individualized
Justice, supra note 16, at 1397–98 (discussing a mortal remains case in which a court applied both
the decedent intent approach and the actual relationship approach).
430. For extended discussion of the decedent intent approach‘s treatment of validly executed
written instruments, see Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 258.
431. See id. (setting out changes in mental capacity doctrines and rules).
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decedent lacked mental capacity.432 Under the decedent intent approach,
the ―unnatural disposition‖ would effectively become ―natural.‖ Mental
capacity doctrines would now focus solely on protection of the decedent.
Protection of family survivors would be irrelevant. Thus, a court would
enforce a validly executed testamentary or nontestamentary provision for a
pet except in the rare case where strong evidence exists that the provision
did not in fact represent the decedent‘s true desires due to senility, fraud,
duress, undue influence, and the like.
The decedent intent approach would go still further. Because its
principal concern would be intent rather than formalities, this approach
would extend protection to written instruments that clearly expressed an
individual‘s desire to provide for her pets but failed to meet execution
requirements.433 In so doing, it would address a significant problem
identified above.434 As case after case has demonstrated, legal formalities
have been a trap for the unwary, especially lay, pet owner. Even the most
minor deviations from execution requirements have frustrated pet owners‘
intent and doomed their pets to an uncertain future. In contrast, under the
decedent intent approach, a misplaced signature or scratched-out will
provision would not prevent a decedent‘s nonhuman loved ones, like Mary
Tyrrell‘s ―pets‖435 or Beatrice Katz‘s ―feline friend,‖436 from inheriting.
The decedent intent approach would also respond to a related problem
that has defeated individuals‘ efforts to provide for their pets: drafting
errors.437 As Part III has shown, precedent already exists for this reform.
UPC drafters and legislators who have followed their example have
adopted pet trust statutes that explicitly make a pet owner‘s actual intent
rather than the specific written expression of that intent determinative.
These statutes provide for liberal construction of pet care provisions ―to
bring the transfer within [the pet trust statute] . . . and to carry out the
general intent of the transferor.‖438 The statutes even permit the
introduction of extrinsic evidence to ascertain that intent.439
The UPC model has two potential limitations on decedent intent,
however. First, the UPC statute could be interpreted to apply only to
dispositive instruments decedents intended as ―trusts‖ for their pets. Thus,
it might not encompass a document like a poorly drafted contract to
devise.440 Second, the statute subjects a pet care provision that qualifies as
432. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
433. See Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 260–62 (discussing changes in will
execution requirements).
434. See supra Part II.B.4.
435. See supra notes 193–202 and accompanying text (discussing Estate of Tyrrell).
436. See supra notes 188–92 and accompanying text (discussing Katz‘s failed effort to provide
for her cat).
437. See supra notes 271–75 and accompanying text. For extended discussion of how the
decedent intent approach could change construction and interpretation rules, see Foster, Family
Paradigm, supra note 16, at 258–60.
438. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2–907(b) (amended 2006).
439. Id.
440. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing contracts to devise).
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a ―trust for pets‖ to statutory requirements that may directly contradict a
pet owner‘s intent. One notable example is the provision that gives courts
the authority to reduce pet trust funds that ―substantially exceed[] the
amount required for the intended use.‖441 The decedent intent approach
would remove both restrictions. It would extend liberal construction rules
to all written pet care arrangements regardless of whether those
arrangements were intended as trusts or even resembled trusts. Moreover,
this approach would allow individuals to devise their own plans for care of
their pets rather than imposing legislative notions of an appropriate
scheme.
The decedent intent approach would even consider oral expressions of
intent to provide for pets.442 At first glance, this appears to be a radical
proposal. In fact, however, one state―Oregon―has already moved in this
direction. Oregon‘s pet trust statute provides: ―An oral or written
declaration shall be liberally construed in favor of finding the creation of a
trust under this section.‖443 The decedent intent approach would take the
next step. It would allow courts to go beyond the trust context and uphold
oral statements of a decedent‘s wishes regarding care of her pets if clear
and convincing evidence of those wishes existed.444 The decedent intent
approach could even follow the lead of courts in mortal remains cases and
consider not only any written or oral declaration of intent but also an
individual decedent‘s ―acts, state of mind, . . . and ‗intensity of . . .
feelings.‘‖445
It should be noted, however, that the decedent intent approach would
not honor all pet owner directives. A 1964 Pennsylvania case446 provides a
prime illustration of such a directive. In 1963, Ida Capers died, survived by
the two ―chief objects of [her] affection,‖ her Irish setters, Brickland and
Sunny Birch.447 Out of fear that her two companions ―would grieve for her
or that no one would afford them the same affection and kindness that they
received during her life,‖448 Capers included in her will a provision
ordering her executors to destroy her dogs ―‗in a humane manner.‘‖449
Fortunately for Brickland and Sunny Birch, the executors did not comply
with this directive and instead filed a petition for declaratory judgment.
The court held that the provision was void against public policy, stating ―to
destroy these two Irish setters that have displayed nothing but fidelity and
affection, would be an act of gross inhumanity.‖450
441. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2–907(c)(6) (amended 2006); see also supra notes 328–36
(criticizing pet trust statutory requirements).
442. See Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1379 (discussing this approach in
mortal remains cases).
443. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130.185(1) (West 2010) (emphasis added).
444. See Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1391 (discussing this approach).
445. Id. at 1392–93 (quoting Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 129 (N.Y. 1926)).
446. Capers Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121 (Orphans‘ Ct. 1964).
447. Id. at 121, 126.
448. Id. at 126.
449. Id. at 122 (quoting will provision).
450. Id. at 133–34. Interestingly, the court applied the decedent intent approach. After
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2. The Actual Relationship Approach
The actual relationship approach too would look beyond the family
paradigm for a more flexible, individualized approach to inheritance.
Rather than basing inheritance rights on the traditional status-based
definition of ―natural objects,‖ this approach would focus on the particular
relationships of a decedent with others―nonhuman as well as human―in
the decedent‘s life.451 Interestingly, in the pet context, proponents of this
approach would have a vast literature from which to draw inspiration. In
recent work, scholars, practitioners, and animal rights advocates have
written extensively about the importance of the human-animal bond in
American society today.452 They have called for legal reforms, especially in
the areas of custody disputes over pets453 and recovery for the tortious
death of a pet,454 that would recognize the ―uniqueness and strength of
[that] bond.‖455
This literature is directly relevant to the actual relationship approach to
inheritance. Specifically, just as in the inheritance context, authors have
emphasized the need to examine the ―individualized‖456 relationship
between a pet owner and a pet. Moreover, they have identified a number of
factors that courts could use in inheritance cases to evaluate the ―depth of
the relationship‖457 between decedent and pet. These factors fall into four
broad categories.
First, courts could examine the ―duration and continuity‖458 of the
relationship, including the frequency of contact and interaction between a
examining evidence of Capers‘ extraordinary love, affection, and treatment of her dogs, the court
concluded that the will did not express her actual intent. See id. at 129–30 (stating that Capers
―would rather see her pets happy and healthy and alive than destroyed‖). For extended discussion of
testamentary directives to destroy pets, see generally Frances Carlisle, Destruction of Pets by Will
Provision, 16 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 894 (1981); Reppy, supra note 118, at 219–25; Abigail J.
Sykas, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: Can the Public Policy Doctrine Prohibit the Destruction of
Property by Testamentary Direction?, 25 VT. L. REV. 911, 930–34, 939–43 (2001).
451. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 268–70; Foster, Individualized Justice, supra
note 16, at 1388, 1393–98.
452. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
453. See, e.g., Huss, supra note 337; Lacy L. Shuffield, Pet Parents―Fighting Tooth and Paw
for Custody: Whether Louisiana Courts Should Recognize Companion Animals as More than
Property, 37 S.U. L. REV. 101 (2009); Heidi Stroh, Puppy Love: Providing for the Legal Protection
of Animals when Their Owners Get Divorced, 2 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 231 (2007).
454. See, e.g., Lynn A. Epstein, Resolving Confusion in Pet Owner Tort Cases: Recognizing
Pets‟ Anthropomorphic Qualities Under a Property Classification, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 31 (2001);
Margit Livingston, The Calculus of Animal Valuation: Crafting a Viable Remedy, 82 NEB. L. REV.
783, 784–85 (2004); Sonia S. Waisman & Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of “Non-Economic”
Damages for Wrongful Killing or Injury of Companion Animals: A Judicial and Legislative Trend,
7 ANIMAL L. 45 (2001).
455. Wilson, supra note 345, at 194.
456. Squires-Lee, supra note 347, at 1098–99.
457. MATLACK, supra note 348, at 87–88.
458. Id. at 88; see also Epstein, supra note 454, at 47 (emphasizing the ―length of time the pet
has been with the owner‖).
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459

decedent and a pet. Second, courts could consider the decedent‘s care of
the pet. For example, they could assess the extent to which the decedent
had ―fed, groomed, housed, and maintained [the pet] in a safe
environment,‖460 regularly exercised the pet,461 and provided medical
care.462
Third, courts could look at the ―emotional connection the owner had
with his or her animal‖463 as another indicator of the strength of the bond
between decedent and pet. Several authors have focused on whether a
family-type attachment464 existed between owner and pet. One
commentator has suggested that evidence of such an attachment might be
―photos of the pet paid to be taken or snapshots displayed, extraneous
expenditures (treats, massages, birthdays, holidays, etc.), sleep patterns
(special bed or with owner) [, and] . . . [p]articipation in family activities:
attending family vacations, shopping trips, or other outings.‖465 Under the
actual relationship approach, courts would examine similar evidence in
inheritance cases, but would not assess whether the relationship between
the decedent and a pet was familial in nature.
Fourth, courts would evaluate the relationship of the pet with the
decedent as well as the relationship of the decedent with the pet. The above
three categories emphasized the decedent‘s treatment of the pet. Here,
courts would look instead for evidence that the pet played a significant role
in the decedent‘s life.466 For example, courts could consider whether the
pet provided the decedent ―‗companionship, pleasure, fun, physical
security and protection, physical health and service.‘‖467 In addition, courts
could examine how the pet contributed to the decedent‘s emotional and
psychological well-being through, for instance, ―comfort, depression
reduction or anti-anxiety effects, or other therapeutic effects.‖468 Courts
might give particular weight to relationships between service or therapy
animals and decedents. Indeed, attorney Carolyn Matlock has argued that
in such cases, courts should ―presume[] . . . the existence of a strong
human-animal bond.‖469
In short, the actual relationship approach would align inheritance law
with current societal views of family and pets. It would recognize that a
459. MATLACK, supra note 348, at 88; Fransheneka J. Watson, Note, Raising the Damage
Award for the Loss of a Beloved Pet Via the Creation of a New Category: Pet as a “NonFunctional Dependant,” 33 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 315, 324 (2008).
460. MATLACK, supra note 348, at 88.
461. Stroh, supra note 453, at 236.
462. MATLACK, supra note 348, at 88; Julian Lee, Woof, Woof: A Call for Legislative Action to
Help Companion Animals and Those Who Care for Them, 32 W. ST. U. L. REV. 141, 154 (2004).
463. Root, supra note 345, at 447.
464. See, e.g., Pintar, supra note 417, at 758.
465. Wilson, supra note 345, at 194.
466. Epstein, supra note 454, at 47 (―Courts should also require testimony as to . . . examples
of the important role the pet played in the owner‘s life . . . .‖).
467. Pintar, supra note 417, at 740 & n.23 (quoting a ―1999 study commissioned by three
prominent veterinary associations‖).
468. Wilson, supra note 345, at 194.
469. MATLACK, supra note 348, at 88.
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decedent‘s closest ties may well be with those the family paradigm
excludes. The actual relationship approach would at long last put
inheritance law on ―‗the evolutionary path toward laws that respect and
uphold the value of human-animal relationships.‘‖470
V. CONCLUSION
Pets of the rich and famous garner the headlines.471 Yet, as this Article
has shown, Americans from all walks of life want to ensure their
nonhuman loved ones a secure future. Billionaire Leona Helmsley,472
―King of Torts‖ Melvin Belli,473 and singer Dusty Springfield474 left money
for care of their pets. But so too did retired policeman John Renner,475
railroad worker Donna Maltese,476 and secretary Beatrice Katz.477
At a time when more and more Americans are turning to pets for
companionship and love, inheritance law still brands those relationships as
―unnatural.‖ Rules governing intestacy, wills, trusts, and will substitutes
defeat decedents‘ wishes to ensure their pets a secure future. Inheritance
law prefers the nephew who never met his elderly, widowed aunt over the
Siamese cat who was her ―constant companion‖ for nearly two decades.478
The plight of decedents‘ pets exposes a larger systemic flaw—
inheritance law‘s outdated family paradigm. Under the family paradigm,
the decedent‘s ―natural objects‖ are, by definition, the decedent‘s closest
relatives by blood, adoption, or marriage. In 21st century America,
however, the situation is more complex. The decedent‘s ―natural objects‖
are those the particular decedent valued most—survivors connected by
affection and support rather than family status alone. Nonetheless, the
inheritance system continues to impose its single, abstract, family-biased
vision of ―natural‖ wealth distribution and to ignore individuals‘ actual
470. Root, supra note 345, at 444 (quoting Chrisanne Beckner, Pain and Suffering: Veterinary
Malpractice Lawsuit Challenges the Notion that Pets Are Merely Property, NEWSREVIEW.COM
(May 31, 2001), http://www.newsreview.com/sacramento/content?oid=6585).
471. See, e.g., Mark Maremont & Leslie Scism, Little Dog, Large Estate: Chihuahua at Center
of Fight Over Posner Heiress‟s Will, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10
001424052748703513604575311020555877854.html; Pooch Living Off Heiress‟ $1B, N.Y. POST,
May 25, 2002, at 10.
472. See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text.
473. Steve Rubenstein, New Fight Over Belli‟s Scribbled Wills, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 19, 1996,
at A13 (reporting that in his holographic will, Belli left $10,000 to his dogs, Rhumpy, Ozzie,
Momba, and Sky); see also Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 33, 57 n.95 (1999) (discussing Belli‘s will).
474. See SELTZER & BEYER, supra note 74, at 122 (discussing Springfield‘s provisions for her
cat, Nicholas).
475. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
476. See Amy Sacks, When Pets Get Left Behind Facilities Can Make Sure Animals Well
Cared for After Their Owner Dies, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Sept. 8, 2007, at 16 (reporting that railroad
worker Donna Maltese made arrangements in her will for Thunder, her twenty-five-year-old African
gray parrot).
477. See supra notes 188–92 and accompanying text.
478. Michael Sangiacomo, Widow‟s Will Leaves Questions, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 19, 1999, at
1B.
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relationships and intent. The costs only continue to mount for all affected
by inheritance law‘s family paradigm.
This Article has demonstrated once again that the injustices of the
inheritance system cannot be addressed by piecemeal reforms.479
Reformers must challenge the very conceptual basis of inheritance law—
the family paradigm‘s narrow definition of ―natural objects.‖ Until
reformers look beyond the family paradigm, Americans and their loved
ones—both nonhuman and human—will remain ―trapped in a universe that
no longer exists.‖480

479. See supra Part III. For earlier critiques of piecemeal reforms, see Foster, Family
Paradigm, supra note 16, at 222–40; Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1364–85.
480. WISE, supra note 343, at 9 (formatting altered).
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